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ABSTRACT 
Current crisis communication plans and guidance at all levels of government focus 
almost exclusively on communication during a crisis, rather than a comprehensive 
approach that also addresses the timeframe well before and well after a disaster. 
Furthermore, existing crisis communication strategy does not include approaches to 
enhance resiliency in individuals and communities affected by disaster.  
A case study of the 2007 Greensburg, Kansas tornado assessed the crisis 
communication strategy surrounding the disaster to assist in the development of a new 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for homeland security.  
The case study revealed the need for homeland security leaders to reframe crisis 
communication by considering disasters as the norm, not a rarity.  The case study also 
found significant benefits to utilizing a complex systems approach in crisis 
communication strategy, specifically the pragmatic complexity model. 
New crisis communication approaches were recommended including a public 
partnership approach and a resilient messaging/survivor psychology approach.  
The research recommendations also included specific before and after message 
themes to engage the public and help them become more resilient.  
The case study and research concluded a state-level strategy would be most 
beneficial and would allow specific messaging to be delivered by leaders familiar to the 
community affected.  
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I. A NEW STRATEGY NEEDED FOR CRISIS 
COMMUNICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Problems with Current Crisis Communication Strategy 
Effective crisis communication is a critical element to a successful domestic 
response following a terrorist attack or other disaster whether here in the U.S. or abroad. 
The events of 9/11 confirmed the need for crisis communication planning for 
organizations in the homeland security enterprise (Giuliani, 2002, p. 16), and a few years 
later the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina revealed the devastating impacts a failure 
in crisis communication can have upon a community and a nation (Bush, 2010, p. 310). 
However, it does not take a mega-event like 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina to prove the need 
for comprehensive crisis communication planning. A deadly EF-5 tornado, which nearly 
destroyed the entire community of Greensburg, Kansas in 2007, also reveals the 
importance of a comprehensive crisis communication strategy. 
Although communication plans have been developed to address what leaders 
should do and say during a crisis and in the immediate aftermath (the response phase), 
there is a very limited emphasis on what leaders should be doing and saying long before a 
crisis happens and in the recovery phase long after it is over. In addition, these plans do 
not incorporate resilient messaging, that is, honest messages of the significant challenges 
ahead combined with messages of hope for a better future. This would better engage the 
public to work through the difficulties together and help build a more resilient 
community. Therefore, a comprehensive crisis communication strategy for homeland 
security leaders is needed to address communication before, during, and after a crisis and 
to engage the public as a partner in emergency preparedness and response to help build 
more resilient individuals and communities.  
A review of crisis communication guides and training materials developed by and 
for federal homeland security entities reveals the need for a new comprehensive strategy 
and a broader emphasis on public engagement. As these titles indicate, these documents 
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focus heavily on messages in the midst of the crisis: Communicating in a Crisis: Risk 
Communication Guidelines for Public Officials (Health and Human Services [HHS], 
2002), Considerations in Risk Communication: A Digest of Risk Communication as a 
Risk Management Tool (Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2003), and a draft 
document from several homeland security entities entitled, Nuclear Detonation 
Preparedness: Communicating in the Immediate Aftermath (Office of the President, 
2010). In addition, the nationally recognized Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Basic and Advanced Public Information Officer Courses designed for 
spokespeople and leaders in emergency management-related-fields, focus almost 
exclusively on communicating during and immediately after a crisis, specifically with 
media. Therefore, these documents miss key strategic opportunities for providing 
individuals with actions and messaging well before a crisis or in the many months 
following the crisis, and overlook the complexity of communicating in a crisis (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2005; FEMA, 2009). 
Furthermore, specific messaging to improve resiliency in the population is not a 
part of current homeland security communication plans and strategy. For example, the 
Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security has only one paragraph in the 84-page document 
referencing the importance of messages prior to an event to encourage the public to take 
actions to prepare and protect themselves, steps that could improve individual resiliency 
(Ferro, Henry, & MacLellan, 2010, p 22). A comprehensive approach to crisis 
communication (before, during, and after) incorporating messaging and actions 
compelling individuals to take preparedness measures would provide the public tools to 
be more resilient when a crisis occurs.  
2. Reframing the Way We Think about Disasters and Crisis 
Communication 
A shift in thinking about disasters and crises would help homeland security 
leaders in developing an ongoing and comprehensive crisis communication strategy. Per 
Bak, a Danish physicist who developed theories about accidents, disasters, and society, 
suggested a different view, that “we treat catastrophes as the norm” rather than the 
exception (Lewis, 2011, p. 10). This change to viewing disasters as the norm instead of as 
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a rarity would help homeland security leaders realize the importance of an ongoing cycle 
of crisis communication. This cycle would involve homeland security leaders providing 
continual resiliency-focused messages, adapted to the needs of the current circumstances 
(before, during, and after a crisis) and incorporating a strategy to engage the public as a 
partner in all phases of disaster.  This shift in thinking and message timing would also 
improve the chances of messages being received by the public. According to CDC 
officials, “Communicating in a crisis is different. In a serious crisis, all affected people 
take in information differently, process information differently and act on information 
differently” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2002b, p. 4). Because of 
this, a comprehensive crisis communication approach is needed at all levels of 
government to ensure messages get to people during all phases of a crisis, not just during 
the crisis when they may struggle to process the message. This approach helps ensure 
they receive information to protect themselves and their families and assist emergency 
responders by following directions or offering help at the scene, if needed. 
3. Defining Crisis Communication, Risk Communication, Resilient 
Communication 
a. Crisis Communication 
Crisis communication is defined as “the dialog between the organization 
and its public prior to, during, and after the negative consequence. The dialog details 
strategies and tactics designed to minimize damage to the image of the organization” 
(Fearn-Banks, 2009, p. 9).  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
provides a similar definition, calling it communication about a crisis to stakeholders and 
the public with the crisis being an unexpected event that may not be in the organization’s 
control and may cause harm to its reputation (CDC 2002a, p. 5). Another definition 
expands upon these two by describing more specifically what an organizational crisis is: 
“a specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or series of events that create high levels 
of uncertainty and simultaneously present an organization with both opportunities for and 
threats to its high-priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2010, p. 7).  Crisis 
communication incorporates messages to help the leadership and public focus on the 
actions being taken and the actions the public should take, with an emphasis on leaders 
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being empathetic and honest in the delivery of those messages. This communication 
could include events ranging from a health issue like bird flu and H1N1 flu to an ongoing 
attack in a community like the D.C. sniper case, or a devastating earthquake, tornado, or 
terrorist attack like Oklahoma City or 9/11. It could also encompass a private entity such 
as a theme park accident or medicine being tampered with (i.e., the Tylenol scare of the 
1980s).  
b. Risk Communication 
Risk communication is a term often used when discussing crisis 
communication. It is defined as “an interactive process of exchange of information and 
opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions; often involves multiple messages 
about the nature of risk or expressing concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages” 
(HHS, 2002, p. 4). Risk communication encompasses the need to communicate risks and 
benefits to stakeholders and the public (CDC, 2002a, p. 6). For example, risk 
communication messages are needed when the public may not see the benefits over the 
risks of a proposed nuclear power plant in their community. They may be unaware of the 
safety record of such plants. Risk communication emphasizes messages that help the 
public understand the real risk, not just their perceptions, and it also may offer some 
messages to lower expectations so that they realize there is still a risk, because nothing is 
100 percent fail-proof.  
c. Resilient Communication 
The New Oxford Dictionary defines resilience as “the ability of a 
substance or object to spring back into shape; elasticity, the capacity to recover quickly 
from difficulties; toughness” (Oxford Dictionary Online, 2011). For the purposes of this 
thesis, resilient messaging/resilient communication is defined as communication that 
provides a realistic assessment of the potential challenges a catastrophic event can bring, 
offers hope and encouragement during tragedy, and helps individuals and communities 
bounce back after experiencing devastation. Furthermore, resilient communication 
engages the public as a partner before, during, and after disaster, to help build stronger 
individuals and communities. 
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4. Overview of Recent National Disaster Crisis Communication 
Challenges 
Homeland security leaders are usually expected to communicate to the public 
about a crisis when it occurs by addressing what is being done and what the public can 
do. This is recommended according to the various homeland security communication 
guides referenced above. Some leaders do well. Perhaps they have received crisis 
communication training or have a background requiring extensive skills in 
communicating challenging concepts. But other homeland security leaders struggle and 
may not have had any training due to higher priorities in the organization in which they 
work or perhaps being a great communicator is just not important to them personally. 
While those in leadership positions are expected to lead effectively, there simply may not 
have been a requirement placed on them to show they are an effective crisis 
communicator. This puts them at a major disadvantage when a crisis happens.  
Unfortunately, former FEMA director Mike Brown learned this the hard way and 
his lack of crisis communication skills was a career ender for him during Hurricane 
Katrina (MSNBC, 2005).  In contrast, former New York City Mayor Rudolf Giuliani 
made an effort to become a better communicator while progressing through political 
office. He explains in his book, Leadership, how he worked with his communication staff 
often and they taught him to “communicate directly and with emotional honesty,” and he 
used those communication skills during and after the 9/11 response (Guiliani, 2002). 
Similarly, in Greensburg, Kansas following the deadly May 4, 2007 tornado, Maj. Gen. 
Tod Bunting, the director of Kansas Division of Emergency Management and Kansas 
Adjutant General, understood the importance of communication in a crisis. He arrived on 
the scene as the sun was coming up over the destruction and began talking with media 
and then asked what it was they needed to be able to tell the world the Greensburg story 
(Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 2010c).  
These disasters point to the need for every homeland security leader, whether 
governor or fire chief, a politician or not, in a large city or small one, to make it a priority 
to learn to communicate before a crisis happens to his or her community and to follow a 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for public engagement. 
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The impact of a failure in crisis communication can be tragic, including loss of 
life if the public does not get the information needed to make the right choices for their 
safety and their family’s safety, loss of the public’s trust if there is not clear direction, and 
loss of control of a disaster scene if the public does not work with emergency responders 
and follow their directions. Hurricane Katrina provides examples of the above and of 
poor crisis communication at various levels of government throughout various stages of 
the disaster.    
According to The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 
“Federal, State, and local officials gave contradictory messages to the public, creating 
confusion and feeding the perception that government sources lacked credibility” (White 
House, 2006b).  Public disputes between New Orleans’ Mayor Ray Nagin, Louisiana 
Governor Kathleen Blanco, and President George W. Bush raised more questions than 
answers for the public regarding what was being done and what the public should do. 
Ultimately, the result was loss of public trust in government, questions of who was really 
in control of the disaster scene, debates about the role of active duty military and National 
Guard, and questions about whether the government’s delayed actions caused more 
people to die (Forman, 2007, pp. 201–203). Former President Bush acknowledged this in 
his memoir, Decision Points, “Katrina conjures impressions of disorder, incompetence, 
and the sense that government let down its citizens. Serious mistakes came at all levels, 
from the failure to order a timely evacuation…to the dreadful communications and 
coordination” (Bush, 2010, p. 310).  Even Lt. Gen. Russell Honore (retired), commander 
of active duty troops in Hurricane Katrina’s response, despite his take-charge persona, 
expressed in his book how difficult it was to gain please the public in the situation. He 
stated, “Everybody seemed to have an agenda, and to hear it from the people with those 
agendas, we were not doing anything right” (Honore, 2009, p. 161). 
Federal authorities did determine the need for a better crisis communication plan 
after Hurricane Katrina, but to date, that plan has not been developed. The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned states, “The Department of Homeland 
Security should develop an integrated public communications plan to better inform, 
guide, and reassure the American public before, during, and after a catastrophe” (White 
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House, 2006a, 73–75).  Even this recommendation falls short because, given the context 
of the report, it focuses on actions immediately before a disaster (such as use of the 
Emergency Alert System) and immediately after a crisis, rather than an ongoing 
comprehensive crisis communication plan that continually cycles from “before” 
messages/actions to “during” messages/actions to “after” messages/actions. For example, 
once a crisis is near the end of a recovery phase, the plan cycles back to the “before” 
phase of communicating messaging and actions guiding and urging the public to prepare 
for the next crisis. 
In conclusion, developing a comprehensive crisis communication strategy to 
incorporate into homeland security leaders’ action plans and messaging before, during, 
and after a crisis, is critical to the success of homeland security efforts in the U.S. In 
addition, homeland security leaders’ effective use of resiliency messaging to encourage 
public partnership during all phases of a crisis (before, during, and after) will improve the 
public’s chances of rebounding from the crisis individually and will help them work 
together toward a better future. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To determine what a new crisis community strategy for homeland security should 
consist of, this thesis research considered the following question and subset of questions 
using a literature review and case study of the 2007 Greensburg, Kansas tornado:  
What can we learn from the communication practices surrounding the 
deadly Greensburg, Kansas tornado in May 2007 to assist in developing a 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for before, during, and after a crisis 
that incorporates resilient messaging and encourages public engagement?  
Answers to the subset of questions below helped in developing the specific 
aspects of the comprehensive crisis communication strategy.   
 What is a reasonable approach for homeland security leaders to engage the 
public in crisis communications before, during, and after a crisis to 
enhance community resilience?  
 What message themes should homeland security leaders use to help the 
public better prepare for, respond to, and recover from a crisis?  
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 Can research into individual resiliency and survivor psychology provide 
insight into crisis communication messaging that will help the general 
public?  
 What do communication practices in disasters, other than the Greensburg 
tornado, offer to the development of a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy for homeland security?  
 At what level of government (local, state, or federal) should this 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for homeland security be 
implemented?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review assisted in answering the above research questions by 
determining what crisis communication guidance is available to homeland security 
leaders in federal, state, and local government, specifically regarding comprehensive 
crisis communication planning and messaging for all phases of a crisis. The review also 
determined what research has been conducted regarding messages to compel the public to 
become more involved in all phases of a crisis and what the field of survivor psychology 
and resiliency research can offer to crisis communication strategy. Finally, the review 
revealed which case studies including the Greensburg, Kansas tornado disaster might 
provide practices that would be applicable to developing a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy and messaging themes for all phases of a crisis.  
There are two primary categories of literature and several subcategories of 
literature that are critical to the research.  The first category is effective crisis 
communication methodology with the subcategories of:  
 Risk communication and crisis communication techniques;  
 Public involvement using crisis communication;  
 Using resiliency and survivor psychology research in crisis 
communications;  
 Case studies involving the Greensburg, Kansas tornado and other 
examples of crisis response; and  
 Complexity models for crisis communication.  
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The second category is homeland security leadership’s role in crisis 
communication with the subcategories of 1) importance of leadership skills in crisis 
communication and 2) importance of crisis communication training for homeland 
security leaders.   
1. Effective Crisis Communication Methodology 
a. Risk Communication and Crisis Communication 
There are several books, government publications, and articles that 
address risk communication and crisis communication and recommend techniques to use 
in a crisis. These documents include a significant amount of research on risk and crisis 
communication by two authors in particular in the past 20 years:  Vincent Covello and 
Peter Sandman. Covello and Sandman’s recommendations for improving messages in a 
crisis represent some of the more significant advances in the crisis communication field 
due to their research efforts. For example, Covello studied news conferences presented 
around the world following a crisis event to determine the 77 most asked questions by 
reporters in an effort to help communicators be prepared to answer those questions using 
psychological concepts of how people perceive information (2005). In addition to 
publishing much of their research findings, Covello and Sandman have also served as 
government consultants on controversial issues like nuclear power and health scares, 
including SARS and West Nile Virus. Each has provided a large amount of their work on 
their respective Websites: http://www.psandman.com/ (Sandman) and 
http://www.centerforriskcommunication.com/staff.htm (Covello). Furthermore, Covello 
teaches a number of principles of crisis communication using psychology as a basis for 
his research. Sandman addresses some best practices for engaging with the media on 
controversial topics and looks at the impact of the public reaction, including how panic 
and fear should be addressed.  
Two specific resources often used as textbooks in crisis communication 
university programs focus heavily on crisis communication theory. Author, Timothy 
Coombs, in Ongoing Crisis Communication, discusses the need for a crisis management  
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plan to prepare for potential vulnerabilities (1999).  Crisis Communication Theory and 
Practice, by Alan Jay Zaremba, focuses not only on preparing and responding to a crisis, 
but also ethical issues (2010). 
Several government publications have been developed in the last decade to 
incorporate using crisis communication techniques for specific issues such as health, 
environment, and education. These include:  
 Crisis & Emergency Risk Communication by Leaders for Leaders (CDC, 
2002), 
 Communicating in a Crisis: Risk Communication Guidelines for Public 
Officials (Health and Human Services [HHS], 2002),  
 Terrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies: A Reference Guide for 
Media (HHS, 2005),  
 Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication (EPA, 1988),  
 Considerations in Risk Communication—A Digest of Risk 
Communication as a Risk Management Tool (EPA, 2003), and  
 Crisis Communications Guide and Toolkit (National Education 
Association [NEA], 2000).  
Many of these publications are also available on government Websites.  
A variety of books and articles also discuss crisis communication 
management in politics and offer beneficial crisis communication techniques garnered 
from the political world. These include several titles by political spokespeople including 
Ten Minutes from Normal (2004) by Karen Hughes, Taking Heat: The President, The 
Press, and My Years in the White House (2005), by Ari Fleisher, and Lipstick on a Pig 
(2008) by Torie Clarke.  Despite their political focus, these types of publications have 
information on crisis communication that is very relevant to government crisis 
communication situations.  For example, Hughes notes how her experience as press 
secretary confirmed the press values speed over thoughtfulness and how the 24-hour 
news cycle known for repeating stories multiple times, makes it very challenging to 
change an impression once it is set.  This material offers insight into specific crisis 
communication techniques used in political environments, which due to the nature of 
politics, offers many opportunities for crisis response, which can be applied to disaster 
and emergency settings. 
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A number of books also address how best to deliver messages during a 
crisis.  In the book, The Heart of Communicating, the author covers the importance of 
communicating in a way so the public believes you care, for example, by showing 
empathy (Brundage, 2006). Other materials build on this concept and focus on preparing 
a spokesperson and organization for a crisis response. Another important resource in 
providing methods for delivery of messages is the Executive Media Training Workshop 
Handbook, which author James Lukaszewski (2005) uses in daylong training sessions. 
This book has a number of checklists and guidelines to help the reader understand the 
needs of the media and improve delivery.  
The Media Relations Handbook for Agencies, Associations, Nonprofits 
and Congress (2004) by Brad Fitch and The PR Crisis Bible (2007) by Robin Cohn are 
excellent resources as they provide government and businesses advice on handling a 
variety of crisis scenarios. Although Cohn’s focus is primarily on businesses rather than 
government, the book is an excellent “how to” guide for managing difficult and 
challenging situations when the organizations reputation may be negatively affected. It 
also addresses how public perception impacts messages and how organizations can 
actually use a crisis to improve their image, if they respond quickly, with the best 
messages and empathy toward the public when appropriate. 
The materials mentioned in the above section offer a significant amount of 
guidance on how spokespeople and their organizations can more successfully manage the 
media and the message immediately after a crisis has occurred. In summary, the guidance 
recommends preparing for what to do in disaster communications by getting to know 
reporters who would be covering a crisis in a specific community or region. It also covers 
choosing the right spokesperson for the job and ensuring information is released 
frequently throughout the early hours of the disaster. In addition, the guidance covers 
understanding the psychology of communication, such as the importance of earning the 
listener’s trust by showing empathetic and caring traits when delivering messages. It also 
includes the following recommendations: release negative information quickly so the 
messages are framed by one’s organization, explain why an issue cannot be discussed, 
and correct misinformation in the news.    
 12
b. Public Involvement in a Crisis  
Some publications address the issue of how to involve the public in a 
crisis incident, which provides insight into the types of messages needed to compel the 
public to take steps to be involved and be more resilient in a crisis. Peter Sandman, in his 
crisis communication training materials, recommends involving the public in disaster 
preparedness and decisions before an emergency and keeping them involved throughout 
it with information on what they can do (2004).  
Some documents address the myth of panic and suggest the public 
generally responds well to a crisis and helps their neighbors rather than climbing over 
them (Clark, 2002). Other researchers, including Covello and Sandman, support this idea 
(HHS, 2005, p. 171; Fischhoff, 2006, p. 80).  This kind of literature provides a new 
viewpoint for addressing concerns of panic and raises the possibility of the benefits of 
more public involvement in all phases of a crisis response and the need for more 
messaging in this area. 
Some of the above referenced materials (primarily those from Covello and 
Sandman) address the benefits of involving the public in a crisis response by having 
leaders communicate to them quickly and telling them what they can do to assist 
themselves and their community.  This information is beneficial to disaster response 
messaging. In addition, because it is psychology-based research, it offers excellent 
guidance on basic language for leaders and spokespeople to include in their messages that 
may help the general public to:  
 Respond in ways which help the responders,  
 Take actions which keep them safe physically, and  
 Help them cope better from a psychological perspective, and be more 
resilient. 
Some research is available assessing how the public responds to disasters 
that can provide insight into what messages may be needed in a to compel individual 
actions before, during, and after a crisis to ensure a more resilient population. For 
example, On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, assesses that 
individuals generally underestimate the chances of a disaster happening, and also 
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generally underestimate how long it takes to mentally recover from a crisis when it does 
happen, indicating we have deep-rooted biases that can impact our decisions before, 
during, and after a crisis (Kunreuther, 2006, p. 178; Meyer, 2006, p. 154). One risk 
communication researcher worth noting for similar research in this area is Baruch 
Fischoff who studies risk management, risk communication failures, the dangers of an 
information vacuum in a crisis, and the impact these have on the public experiencing the 
crisis (Fischoff, 2006, pp. 77–88; Leiss & Powell, 1997, pp. 26–40).  
In summary, this research, indicating how people think and behave before, 
during, and after a crisis is invaluable in determining the best messages and the 
appropriate time for homeland security leaders to deliver those messages. 
c. Resiliency and Survivor Psychology 
Some additional research into resiliency and the study of survivors in 
disasters, known as survivor psychology, reveals beneficial insight into the thought 
processes (or internal messages) helping people survive a catastrophe and why they are 
more resilient following a disaster. Some excellent resources are available including The 
Survivor Personality (2010) and The Resiliency Advantage (2005) by Al Siebert, The 
Survivor’s Club (2009) by Ben Sherwood, and The Unthinkable: Who Survives When 
Disaster Strikes and Why (2008) by Amanda Ripley. These books reveal some extremely 
useful research that may benefit the field of crisis communications. For instance, Siebert, 
a psychologist, describes in The Survivor Personality (2010) how a mindset that 
welcomes adversity as a part of life and a strengthening process helps individuals 
anticipate a crisis, plan for it, survive it, and bounce back from it faster. He also discusses 
throughout the book how an individual’s viewpoint on adversity depends on the self-talk 
she or he uses to frame a situation and then specific actions they take to address the crisis 
(Siebert, 2010, pp. 90, 185). A few other books like, The Adversity Advantage (2006), by 
Erik Weihenmayer and Paul Stolz, and The Adversity Paradox (2009), by J. Barry 
Griswell, look at specific individuals who have used adversity to their advantage, and 
they credit it for pushing them to greater success than they would have otherwise 
attempted. These materials reveal what messages individuals have told themselves to 
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survive a crisis and offer ideas as to the best types of messaging homeland security 
leaders should use to help the public be more resilient in the face of challenging times.  
In summary, the above resources, which focus on resilient individuals 
despite crises, and survivors of disaster, provide insight into messages that could be 
incorporated into crisis communication strategy used by disaster responders and 
homeland security leaders to enhance the resiliency of the community.  
d. Case Study in Kansas and Review of U.S. Disasters 
1.)  Greensburg, Kansas Tornado Case Study.  Several firsthand 
accounts from individuals who survived the tornado have been documented in three 
books published by Greensburg, Kansas tornado survivors. These books detail what 
happened before, during, and after the deadly 2007 Greensburg, Kansas tornado and 
provide insight into the community’s education and awareness of the dangers of tornados 
and what people did to protect themselves.   
Planet Green, a division of Discovery Communication, developed 
a documentary series, including interviews with local leaders and residents regarding the 
impact of the tornado and the rebuilding of Greensburg. This series provides information 
about the mindset of the residents of Greensburg, their resiliency, and their community’s 
leadership.  
In addition, the news media accounts of the ongoing event give 
details about the overall communication efforts before, during, and after the disaster and 
their impact on residents in the community.  
2.)  U.S. Disaster Communication Processes.  In reviewing several 
U.S. disasters, which have occurred in the past 20 years, it is beneficial to compare the 
crisis communication techniques used to inform the public. An assessment of materials 
written about Hurricane Katrina, 9/11, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the Washington, 
D.C. sniper case provides a number of crisis communication lessons learned. Many of 
these materials include books written by those involved in one or more of these crises, 
including George W. Bush in his memoirs, Decision Point (2010) and Rudolf Giuliani in 
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his biography, Leadership (2002). Both of these include their experiences during and 
after 9/11. Several leaders in charge of various aspects of the Hurricane Katrina response 
wrote first-hand accounts of their experiences. For example, Lt. Gen. Russel Honore 
wrote Survival (2009) on his role in Katrina’s response, and New Orlean’s Mayor during 
Katrina, Ray Nagin, discusses his experiences in Katrina’s Secrets (2011). Nagin’s press 
secretary Sally Forman gave her own account in Eye of the Storm, Inside City Hall during 
Katrina (2007). Another firsthand account was written by Charles Moose, the police 
chief in D.C. during the sniper manhunt in October 2002, who describes his experiences 
in Three Weeks in October: The Manhunt for the Serial Sniper (2003). All of these 
materials offer a beneficial inside view at why specific communication methods were 
chosen in a crisis as well as how politics played into messaging development and 
delivery. 
e. Complexity Models and Ideas for Reframing Crisis 
Communication 
Some researchers in the past decade have begun to examine the 
complexity of crisis communication, including the challenges of getting a message to a 
recipient given the dynamics of our society.  Communication has often been seen as 
simple and linear in that one person or group sends a message and another person or 
group receives the message. Too much has changed in society for this simple method to 
be effective in a crisis. Literature, such as Donna Meadows’ book, Thinking in Systems 
(2008), and Nassim Taleb’s book, The Black Swan (2010), provide an excellent overview 
of the complex world we live in and the need to view issues from the complexity within 
which they exist. In crisis communication, this means acknowledging the messages of 
homeland security leaders and other government officials, politicians, media, including 
the fast growing role of social media, and the general public. It also means considering 
how they each affect one another. Researchers at Arizona State University developed the 
pragmatic complexity model to help reframe the way crisis communication in a dynamic 
environment. It recommends embracing complexity, varying approaches and messages, 
considering disruptions, and planning for failure (Corman, Goodall, & Trethewey, 2007, 
pp. 10–12).   
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Another researcher who studied complexity, Per Bak, the Danish physicist 
referenced earlier, also provided a new framework applicable to crisis communication 
when he suggested disasters should be considered the norm “with inconsequential periods 
of calm in between” (Lewis, 2011, p. 10).  Viewing disasters from this perspective could 
help homeland security leaders better utilize the phases well before and well after a 
disaster. 
In summary, this important research into complexity and its application to 
crisis communication provides a critical new reframing tool to utilize when developing a 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for homeland security.  
2. Homeland Security Leaders’ Effective Use of Crisis Communication 
a. Importance of Leadership Skills in Crisis Communication   
Several books assessing the job of homeland security leaders responding 
to the crisis of 9/11 are available, including biographies referenced above such as Rudolf 
Guiliani’s book, Leadership (2002), and President George W. Bush’s book, Decision 
Point (2010).  Others like Sally Foreman’s, Eye of the Storm (2007), provide insight into 
leadership styles during the Hurricane Katrina crisis. Government publications and 
lessons learned reports assess the positives and negatives of the leaders’ communication 
efforts during both 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.  
While much more has been written on leadership during Katrina and 9/11 
than the 2007 tornado in Greensburg, Kansas, there are still a number of news reports and 
magazine articles on the leaders involved in Greensburg.  One book, Effective Crisis 
Communication, Moving from Crisis to Opportunity (Seeger et al., 2010), assessed how 
key community leaders like Steve Hewitt, the city administrator, communicated hope for 
an even better community just a few days after the tornado left a mile and half wide path 
of devastation through town.  Two recorded interviews with Maj. Gen. Tod Bunting, who 
lead the state’s response in Greensburg, addresses his ideas of leadership and some of his 




Department, 2010).  In addition, Greensburg residents have written three books providing 
their personal accounts. These offer some idea of the community resilience and the 
impact leaders had on them. 
The above referenced materials provide information on the importance of 
leadership skills and vision in communicating effectively to the public during a crisis.  
They also reiterate the importance of leaders preparing for their crisis communication 
roles prior to the event occurring. 
b. Importance of Crisis Communication Training for Homeland 
Security Leaders  
Without training our homeland security leaders on the importance of crisis 
communication, it will be challenging to implement a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy effectively. Since homeland security leaders come into their 
roles with a variety of backgrounds and no specific training requirements required by the 
federal, state, or local government, their experience in crisis communication varies 
significantly and can negatively impact a crisis.  
Several articles address the need for more consistent training for homeland 
security leaders to ensure more effective, consistent messaging in a crisis. Unfortunately, 
very little information is available on how to effectively implement crisis communication 
training for homeland security leaders, given their roles and turnover rates. FEMA’s 
Website offers recommended public information officer/communication trainings for 
those involved in the field, including National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
Incident Command System (ICS); however, this training is not required for every 
homeland security leader, including political members (governor and lawmakers). 
Therefore, this leaves a big gap in knowledge and can result in a negative crisis 
communication response to an incident. In addition, this type of training provided by 
FEMA and states does not currently include crisis communication training.  
The high turnover in homeland security leadership positions due to their 
political nature adds to the challenges of training leaders in crisis communication as they 
enter and leave their roles in a short period of time. Another challenge to training is 
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reduced funding. Following 9/11 and the anthrax attacks in the U.S., federal funding for 
crisis communication training was provided for some homeland security entities, but it 
was temporary. Funding cuts at all levels of government in recent years have reduced 
crisis communication training and overall post-9/11 funding of many programs. 
c. Literature Review Conclusion 
In conclusion, this literature review reveals several publications address 
the importance of homeland security leaders using specific crisis communication 
techniques immediately before, during, and immediately after a crisis, and the importance 
of messages to encourage the public to take specific actions immediately before, during 
and immediately after a crisis. A few materials address the need for establishing good 
media relations and community relations on an ongoing basis. However, existing crisis 
communication materials do not address what actions and message themes are necessary 
from homeland security leaders, well before a crisis and well after a crisis, to help 
improve resiliency in communities, and to ensure a truly comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy is in place.   
Case study materials on the deadly 2007 Greensburg tornado, 9/11, and 
Hurricane Katrina present communication practices that could also provide guidance into 
the approaches and messages needed for a more comprehensive approach to crisis 
communication.  
Documents on survivor psychology and resiliency in individuals surviving 
a crisis are plentiful, including books specific to resilient thinking to individual resilient 
behaviors and messages. These can be very useful for determining resiliency messaging 
before, during, and after a crisis for inclusion in a crisis communication strategy for 
homeland security entities.  
Materials specific to preparing leaders for homeland security roles are 
limited in number and reveal a gap in resources; however, a number of materials provide 




crisis communication strategy and messaging. Documents on crisis communication 
training for homeland security leaders are almost nonexistent revealing a gap in research 
and a lack of resources available.  
Research into the complexity of crisis communication is available, but 
sparse. Concepts of complexity, which can be applied to crisis communication, appear in 
literature regarding systems thinking, and a model specific to crisis communication offers 
a new reframing tool for comprehensive crisis communication strategy.  
D. HYPOTHESIS   
A comprehensive crisis communication strategy should be developed for 
homeland security leaders to use before, during, and after a crisis, which incorporates 
resilient messages and survivor psychology to enhance individual and community 
resilience.  
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH   
This research is significant because a comprehensive crisis communication 
strategy for homeland security leaders does not currently exist. Some might argue crisis 
communication guidelines are available to homeland security leaders; however, these 
guides do not provide a plan for a continual communication effort, well before and well 
after a crisis, nor do they incorporate actions and messaging in the before and after phase 
to empower the public to become more resilient to the inevitable crises the public will 
face in the future.  
Thorough research considering whether communication practices from other 
disasters, besides the Greensburg, Kansas tornado, would apply to a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy makes this research an important expansion of the current crisis 
communication literature. It also assists in moving the concept of resilient 
communication forward to guide future research efforts in this area of building resilient 
communities through a comprehensive crisis communication strategy.  
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F. METHOD 
The research for this thesis is a case study of the crisis communication strategy 
used by the state of Kansas and Greensburg leaders before, during, and after the deadly 
2007 EF-5 Greensburg, Kansas tornado to determine what approaches are needed for a 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for homeland security. The case study 
assisted in identifying crisis communication approaches that result in a more engaged and 
resilient public in all phases of a crisis.  
The case study included a review of the complexity of crisis communication 
before, during, and after the Greensburg disaster using the pragmatic complexity model 
as a framework (Corman et al., 2007, pp. 12–14). It also considered the impact of 
applying Per Bak’s reframing of disasters as the norm to crisis communication strategy 
(Lewis, 2011, p. 10). 
Specifically, the case study examined crisis communication approaches the state 
and local leadership used before the Greensburg disaster. Additionally, the case study 
assessed the state and local crisis communication practices during and immediately 
after the Greensburg tornado aftermath. This helped in determining which methodologies 
worked well and which ones did not, including what messages would best enhance 
community resilience. And finally, the case study examined crisis communication actions 
and messages after the Greensburg tornado and how the communication approaches in 
this phase of the disaster can help contribute to a more resilient community in future 
disasters.  
Also, the research involved the review of other large-scale disasters and literature 
on disaster survivors to determine what resilient communication would be useful 
throughout all phases of a disaster.  
Crisis communication efforts in large-scale crisis events such as 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina were examined to determine what lessons learned could be applied to a 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for homeland security leaders.  
In conclusion, the case study revealed why a comprehensive crisis communication 
strategy should be developed for homeland security leaders to use before, during, and 
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after a crisis, which incorporates resilient communication to engage the public as a 
partner in emergency preparedness and response and to build community resilience. This 
thesis utilized the case study, examined crisis communication literature, best practices, 
lessons learned, as well as leadership materials, to determine what elements are needed 
for a comprehensive crisis communication strategy that includes all phases of a disaster 
and includes public engagement to enhance community resilience. 
G. UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
The following chapters expand upon the ideas about crisis communication 
strategy presented in Chapter I. 
Chapter II provides a more in-depth explanation of the numerous problems with 
the current homeland security crisis communication approach. This includes a review of 
the efforts of local, state, and federal government and the lack of emphasis on 
communication that engages the public as a partner in emergency preparedness for the 
purpose of building more resilient communities.  
Chapter III focuses on the case study, which assesses crisis communication 
approaches the state of Kansas and Greensburg leaders used before, during, and after the 
2007 Greensburg tornado. The purpose is to assess what worked and did not work and 
how a comprehensive crisis communication strategy implemented throughout all phases 
of the disaster could have been used to enhance community resiliency.  
Chapter IV includes the analysis of the case study and other research findings to 
determine how to best provide homeland security leaders with a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy encompassing events well before, during, and well after a crisis, 
and emphasizing resilient communication.  
And finally, Chapter V provides conclusions from the research, answers the 
research questions, offers a new approach for homeland security crisis communication 




recommendations for resilient communication practices before, during, and after a crisis. 
It provides a conclusion of how the thesis proved the hypothesis and it also addresses 
future areas for research consideration. 
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II. FRAMING THE PROBLEMS OF CURRENT HOMELAND 
SECURITY CRISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 
This chapter will provide an assessment of the problems with current U.S. 
homeland security crisis communication plans and strategy.  
A. REFRAMING CRISIS COMMUNICATION: A CONTINUAL CYCLE 
WITH “DISASTERS AS THE NORM” 
U.S. strategy would benefit from a new framework for disasters. Danish physicist, 
Per Bak suggested we consider disasters differently, not as something rare and unusual, 
but as the norm (Lewis, 2011, p. 10). Using this concept, the communication cycle is 
continual: we are either preparing the public for a disaster, in one, or recovering from 
one, soon to start the cycle over, therefore, we must focus on messaging for all three 
phases.  
Instead of treating, catastrophes as outliers, why not treat catastrophes as 
the norm, and stability as the outlier? In Bak’s universe, everyday stability 
is simply the prelude to the main event—unexpected and extreme 
collapse. Only through collapses and catastrophes does the world evolve. 
Life is a series of passages from catastrophe to catastrophe with 
inconsequential periods of calm in between. We need to learn to navigate 
stormy seas, because they are the new normal. (Lewis, 2011, p. 10) 
By following Bak’s concept (Lewis, 2011) when we approach the crisis 
communication cycle, we need to put an equal focus on the before, during, and after 
phases to ensure we are continually doing what is necessary to manage the upcoming 
disaster. Our current cycle, based on FEMA’s training materials and guidance documents 
referenced earlier, concentrates on the what to do during a disaster, with some attention to 
immediately before the disaster and immediately after the disaster. Instead, our cycle 
should move toward Figure 1, giving equal attention to the phases well before and well 
after a disaster to ensure efforts and messaging are ongoing, regardless of the phase. The 
specific actions and message themes needed for each of the three phases will be 
addressed later in this document.   
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Figure 1.   Proposed Crisis Communication Cycle 
B. MOVING FROM A LINEAR MODEL TO A COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
MODEL 
1. Linear Model of Crisis Communication Strategy  
Our nation’s current crisis communication strategy is built on linear model 
(Figure 2) rather than a complex systems model (Figure 3), which more closely resembles 
reality. The linear model of crisis communications follows a simple five-step process in a 
best-case scenario:  
1. Government officials/spokespeople work to build relationships with area 
media and develop messages to deliver by specific people when a disaster 
strikes,  
2. A disaster strikes and an assessment is made of messages needed,  
3. The messages are delivered,  
4. The public responds to the messages,  
5. Government officials/spokespeople review the messages delivered to see 
if changes are needed for the remaining situation or the next disaster.  
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This five-step process (see Figure 2) is a summary of key recommendations from 
FEMA’s Basic Public Information Officer and Advanced Public Information Officer 
trainings (FEMA, 2005; FEMA, 2009). 
While, these five steps involve a best-case scenario, many situations involve only 
steps 2, 3, and 4, because the spokesperson has not developed messages in advance and 
does not do any post-disaster analysis to determine what worked or did not work. 
Examples of this can be found by reviewing some major U.S. disasters.  In these cases, 
the leaders of high profile events, who became lead spokespeople in large disasters, 
specifically cite their lack of preparation in communicating with the news media and 
public prior to the event. These include Charles Moose, the police chief of Washington 
D.C., during the sniper shootings (Moose, 2003, p. 163) and Mike Brown, FEMA’s 
director during Hurricane Katrina (Brown & Schwarz, 2011). Also Ray Nagin, the New 
Orleans’ mayor during Katrina, often spoke before determining the best message for the 
situation, one that would help the public determine next steps, set public expectations, 
and help residents keep a resilient mindset (Forman, 2007, pp. 201–203; Nagin, pp. 188–
189). 
If officials simply follow the five-step linear model, they may still have a 
successful outcome in some disasters with some luck and if the situation is simple and 
very straightforward. However, most disasters present a dynamic and complex situation, 
such as the anthrax attacks after 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina. Nassim Taleb, author of The 
Black Swan, points out that “Modern reality rarely gives us the privilege of a satisfying, 
linear, positive progression” (2008, p. 88). Taleb called Hurricane Katrina a “black 
swan.” It is a term he coined to describe something tough to predict based on historical 
data, predictable after the fact or “retrospectively predictable,” and something involving 
random, unlikely and unexpected events (Fora.tv, 2010). But disasters do not have to be 
the size of Hurricane Katrina to require and benefit from a crisis communication strategy 
based on a complex systems view.  The current crisis communication strategy is out of 
sync with a seemingly chaotic and increasingly complex world and needs to be reframed 




Figure 2.   Linear Model of Crisis Communication	
2. The Complex System of Crisis Communication   
Donella Meadows in her book, Thinking in Systems (2008), addresses the concept 
of systems and complexity, which this thesis will apply to the crisis communication cycle 
or system. 
According to Meadows, “A system is an interconnected set of elements that is 
coherently organized in a way that achieves something…a system must consist of three 
kinds of things: elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose” (2008, p. 11).	
The elements of our crisis communication cycle include the messages of 
government officials, politicians, the public, and the media (traditional news media and 
social media).  The interconnections include the flow of information between these four 
entities. A primary purpose of the crisis communication system is to ensure the public is 
informed and remains safe before, during and after a disaster.  	
Before a disaster, specific elements or messages from government officials, 
politicians, public, news media, and social media impact the public’s perspectives during 
and/or after a disaster. Similarly messages given during a disaster can affect public 
response after the disaster. And messages given after a disaster can impact perception of 
the next disaster. At each phase, any given message from government, politicians, the 
public and media can have a significant impact on the communication process, and 
therefore, on the actions and perceptions of everyone involved.  
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Figure 3.   Complex Systems Model of Crisis Communications 
For example, prior to the devastating Greensburg, Kansas tornado in 2007, 
Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius had raised concerns about Kansas National Guard 
equipment not being returned quickly enough to the state for disaster response purposes 
(Hegeman, 2007b). As is common practice during war, some large equipment sent over 
with Kansas National Guard troops had been left behind for other units. Other Kansas 
equipment had been destroyed in battle. The end result was a delay in getting the 
equipment back to Kansas. When the tornado hit and the Kansas Guard was sent to 
Greensburg to assist in response, Gov. Sebelius’s previous concern became a hot topic of 
national debate and national news, drawing 24/7 coverage and a debate between Sebelius 
and the White House (Vu, 2007). The debate intensified due to the different political 
parties of the governor, a Democrat, and President Bush, a Republican. The public debate 
completely refocused the communication surrounding the response for several days, and 
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it was heavily covered by local and national media which prompted many offers of 
assistance from other states and active duty military (Vu, 2007).  
This unexpected political issue in the aftermath of a tornado was just one of many 
communication challenges in Greensburg. Others included few local government officials 
available to make decisions due to being personally affected by the tornado, military 
members looting, and the mayor eventually resigning shortly after the tornado.  Each of 
these actions resulted in reactions and messages from each of the complex system’s four 
primary elements: government, politics, the public, and the media. The dynamic situation 
increased the communication challenges, which could have been improved if leaders had 
been using a complex systems model.  
C. “MESSAGE INFLUENCE MODEL” TO “PRAGMATIC COMPLEXITY 
MODEL” 
A more specific way to view crisis communication as a complex systems model is 
based on a concept developed by the Consortium for Strategic Communication at Arizona 
State University, which recommends changing our views about communication from a 
“message influence model” to a “pragmatic complexity model” (Corman et al., 2007,  
p. 2). 
The message influence model “conceptualizes messages as a vehicle for carrying 
information from a source to a receiver” according to Corman et al. (2007, p. 4). “The 
purpose of the message is to influence the receiver to understand the information in the 
same way as the source, if not persuade him or her to change attitudes or act in a 
particular way” (Corman et al., 2007, p. 4).  
Corman et al. suggest the message influence method fails because the listeners 
“create meanings from messages based on factors like autobiography, history, local 
context, culture, language/symbol systems, power relations, and immediate personal 
needs” (2007, p. 7).  In addition, under this model, individuals and groups interpret 
messages through their “social reality,” holding to a belief, even if it is wrong (Corman et 
al., 2007, p. 7). 
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The pragmatic complexity concept acknowledges that the sender of messages and 
receiver of messages are “locked in a relationship of simultaneous, mutual 
interdependence” (Corman et al., 2007, p. 10). In other words, “the success of A’s 
behavior depends not only on external conditions but on what B does and thinks,” and 
“what B does and thinks is influenced by A’s behavior as well as B’s expectations, 
interpretations, and attributions with respect to A (Corman et al., 2007, p. 10).  
Since the pragmatic complexity concept factors in the mutual interdependence 
between messenger and receiver, this concept could have been beneficial in the hours and 
days after the tornado when a number of factors kept changing (e.g., political focus on the 
Guard response, military members caught looting, mayor resigns). This model 
recommends leaders “de-emphasize control,” rely on “variations on a message theme,” 
anticipate “disruption,” and “plan for failure” with a good contingency plan (Corman et 
al., 2007, pp. 12–14).  
And after the tornado hit, understanding the mutual interdependence of the 
message senders (local and state government leaders, politicians, residents, and media) 
and the message receivers (local and state government leaders, politicians, residents, and 
media) could have been invaluable for homeland security leaders, helping them better 
prepare for the next response.    
This complexity model will be applied to Greensburg further in the case study and 
analysis chapters. 
D. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES OF CURRENT CRISIS COMMUNICATION 
APPROACH   
Our current homeland security crisis communication approach in the U.S. falls 
short in three specific areas:  
1. It is almost entirely focused on how homeland security leaders should 
respond during a crisis, and lacks a comprehensive strategy for the before 
and after phases of a crisis (even the efforts recommended for the before 
phase simply involve how to react during the crisis).  
2. It lacks a viable public engagement component targeted at improving 
individual and community resiliency and building a sense of citizen 
responsibility for preparedness and response. Furthermore, U.S. crisis 
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communication strategy uses a parental approach to the public rather than 
sharing information with the public as an equal partner in solving the 
challenges brought by natural disasters and terrorist attacks. 
3. It lacks use of strategic messaging to enhance resiliency in the population, 
a concept found in survivor psychology.  
1. Focus on During Phase of Disaster vs. “Before”/“After” Phase   
The Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management 
Agency has made many improvements to its disaster and emergency plans since 9/11, 
Hurricane Katrina, and the massive 2007 California wildfires by incorporating lessons 
learned from those disasters. However, its plans are still primarily focused on what do 
during a crisis, overlooking key strategic efforts that could improve public engagement at 
all phases of a crisis. The 2008 National Response Framework is the primary federal 
document guiding the structure of disaster response (FEMA). Its emergency support 
function 15 annex (external affairs) is the guide for crisis communication structure.  This 
annex updated in 2009 “creates framework for providing timely information to affected 
audiences during [emphasis added] an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response” 
(FEMA, 2009c, p. 28).  Unfortunately, neither the 2008 National Response Framework 
nor the external affairs annex updated in 2009, address what communication or specific 
messages to provide in the timeframe well before or well after a crisis.  
The 2009 revision of the FEMA Basic Public Information Officer course, which 
instructs homeland security leaders how to communicate in a crisis, has been updated to 
reference the “cycle of communication” (the before, during, and after phases). 
Unfortunately, the overwhelming emphasis is still on what to do during a crisis rather 
than messaging in all phases. There is some information regarding building relationships 
with media prior to an event, but no mention of messaging that could assist and engage 
the public well before a disaster. Additionally, the references to the before and after 
phases in the 2008 FEMA document and the 2009 Basic PIO document focus only on 
immediately before and immediately after the event. Adding a comprehensive before and 
after approach is an important step in improving public engagement, readiness, and 
resilience in disaster. The current reactive approach to communication overlooks the 
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power homeland security and emergency management leaders can wield with a 
communication strategy that is always in action, before, during, and after a disaster. 
Fortunately, in Greensburg, the dedicated state and local leadership followed the 
available crisis communication strategy during the disaster and focused on getting 
important messages out to inform the public of the actions being taken and actions the 
public needed to take. Leadership also addressed how to have a more resilient recovery 
process as they moved forward. 
Unfortunately, Kansas was operating without a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy for resilient communication to engage the public and enhance 
resiliency before and after the disaster and missed some key opportunities in the before 
and after phases. This will be addressed further in the case study and analysis chapters. 
2. Parental Approach vs. Public Partnership Approach  
The current Department of Homeland Security and FEMA crisis communication 
guidance (as noted in the above documents) focuses on how to work with the news media 
to get messages to the public during times of crisis, rather than incorporating a strategy of 
messages to engage the public as a key partner in a preparedness and response mindset 
throughout the year. While increasing public use of social media has prompted 
DHS/FEMA to expand its communication to social media, the DHS/FEMA approach to 
engaging the public as a partner in preparedness and response is primarily focused on 
telling the public what to do to avoid danger during a crisis rather than messages 
provided long before and after a crisis, which would improve engagement and resilience. 
Traditional messages to the public during an emergency focus on getting the public to 
evacuate or stay where they are or take other specific actions to protect themselves. 
FEMA officials recognize this is a problem. David Kaufman, Director of FEMA’s Office 
of Policy and Program Analysis states, “The way we have been approaching homeland 
security has been too parental. What‘s needed is a strategy for energizing and mobilizing 
the power of the citizenry to contribute meaningfully” (Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security, 2009).  
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Three DHS/FEMA campaigns attempt to get the public more engaged prior to a 
crisis, but their reach is still limited based on survey statistics and target audience. These 
campaigns include the Be Ready campaign, launched in 2003, which encourages the 
public to be informed, have an emergency kit and a plan for their family to be ready for 
disasters (FEMA, 2011). Another is the If You See Something, Say Something campaign 
(DHS, 2011), launched in 2010 to get the public to report suspicious behavior in 
anticipation of terrorism. According to a 2009 FEMA Citizen Corp survey, only 57 
percent of respondents have an emergency kit and only 44 percent have a family plan 
(FEMA, 2009b). FEMA officials recently revised the Be Ready campaign for 2012 
calling it Resolve to Be Ready with a focus on tying disaster preparedness to New Year’s 
resolutions. The If You See Something, Say Something campaign is still being launched in 
numerous venues across the country making it difficult to analyze at this time in this 
document. A third federal campaign, Citizen Corp, launched in 2002, targets individual 
interested in helping response efforts during a crisis, rather than the general public 
(FEMA, 2009b). This program provides a venue for the public to get involved in a 
coordinated way, including training and other requirements, but its message is geared 
toward those individuals wanting to help responders in a crisis.  All of these efforts are a 
step in getting the public involved, but a more comprehensive crisis communication 
strategy would strengthen all of these efforts. 
Additionally, government sends the wrong message by not having a 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for public engagement that will appeal to a 
broader audience. Specifically, the wrong message is that government will be there to 
help regardless of how bad things get.  That is ideal, but not always possible. In addition, 
it leaves out the possibility of engaging a key and critical partner, the public, who by 
being prepared would not become an additional burden on the response system, and could 
possibly even help their neighbors.  
3. Fear of Public Panic Hinders Leadership Actions and Messaging 
One significant challenge to better engaging the public as a partner in emergency 
preparedness and response is an underlying fear among homeland security leadership that 
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the public will panic in a crisis or if given truly honest, but unsettling information. This 
fear among government officials can heavily influence their decisions about what 
messages to give. According to Vincent Covello (HHS, 2005), a risk communication 
researcher who has studied communication in crisis events for many years, leaderships’ 
unfounded fears of panic can result in leaders making a situation worse: 
The assumption that people will immediately panic or behave irrationally 
following a disaster can have negative consequences. Authorities may 
provide inaccurate information or unfounded reassurance motivated by a 
wish to calm the public. The desire to avoid panic may also lead 
authorities to miss opportunities to engage the public in managing the 
disaster. (HHS, 2005, p. 171) 
Understandably, public panic was a concern for New York mayor, Rudolf 
Giuliani, on 9/11. He explained, “I had to communicate with the public, to do whatever I 
could to calm people down and contribute to an orderly and safe evacuation” (Giuliani, 
2002, p. 16). Giuliani’s concerns were reasonable given the circumstance, but research 
into public reactions during 9/11 show the overall reaction from the public was not panic 
(Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2001, p. 218). Lee Clarke, an author and researcher on public 
panic, writes “even when people feel ‘excessive fear’—a sense of overwhelming doom—
they usually avoid ‘injudicious efforts’ and ‘chaos.’ In particular, they are unlikely to 
cause harm to others as they reach for safety and may even put their own lives at risk to 
help others (Clark, 2002, p. 21).   
In addition, “research on population responses to a wide range of natural and 
technological disasters suggest that there is a tendency toward adaptability and 
cooperation,” by the affected public (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2001, pp. 218–219).  
Despite these compelling arguments, fear of public panic remains a theme in 
homeland security communication guidance. Leaders and public information officers are 
frequently urged to take steps to reduce the panic of the public in emergencies: “As the 
acting spokesperson during a risk or crisis event, you need to…minimize confusion and 
panic,” state the authors of the Risk and Crisis Communications: Best Practices for 
Government Agencies and Non-Profit Organizations (Booz, Allen, Hamilton, 2010,  
p. 31). The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Pandemic Influenza 
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Message Guide states, “During a national emergency such as an influenza pandemic, the 
media plays an important role in helping to maintain calm and reduce panic” (2009,  
p. 15). 
The recent research on panic should reduce homeland security leaders’ concerns 
that the public’s reaction to a crisis situation is always panic.  
4. Parental Approach to Public Partnership Approach 
When homeland security leaders assume the public cannot handle certain 
situations and/or information because of fear the public will panic, they are operating 
from a parental approach and assume the public, like a child, must be protected from the 
complete story and only limited information can be shared.  Examples of this way of 
thinking can be found in many homeland security documents and literature including the 
book, Psychology of Terrorism (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 
2007). Authors Rose McDermott and Philip Zimbardo state, “Alerts (terrorism alerts) 
should be targeted geographically as much as possible, so that those who are outside the 
greatest risk zone need not worry unnecessarily [emphasis added]” (2007, p. 366).  They 
later state, “Oftentimes, alerting the general public serves no useful purpose, but 
increases psychological distress [emphasis added] for no practical reason,” and the 
authors say raising force levels “may only cause confusion and anxiety [emphasis added] 
on the part of the general public” (McDermott & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 366). There are 
times when the public may not need certain information, but too much concern by leaders 
over causing public anxiety confirms a parental approach to crisis communication. 
With many years of disaster research debunking the notion of public panic in 
disasters, homeland security leaders can now shift from the fear-based parental approach 
to one of public partnership, where the public is viewed as fully capable of assisting 
themselves and their community in all phases of a crisis response. Clarke believes “our 
leaders would do well to see us as partners in recovery rather than as a ‘constituency’ to 
be handled” (2002, p. 26). 
Shifting from a parental approach to a public partnership approach should happen 
in all phases of a disaster (before, during, and after).  Significant guidance to assist in this 
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change can be found in Developing Strategies for Minimizing the Psychological 
Consequences of Terrorism Through Prevention, Intervention, and Health Promotion 
(2003), a publication of the National Academy of Sciences.  The document proposes 
recommendations to incorporate concepts to improve public engagement and enhance 
public resilience. Current U.S. crisis communication strategy does not include these steps 
in the before and after phases of a crisis.   
5. Incorporating Survivor Psychology into Crisis Communication 
Strategy 
The current homeland security crisis communication strategy would benefit from 
considering the concept of survivor psychology in its messaging approach to enhance 
resiliency in communities across the nation. 
Resilience requires individuals, families and communities, not only to be 
physically prepared, but also to be mentally prepared, by having a survivor mindset. 
Looking once again to history for an example, Winston Churchill demonstrated this 
concept in his speeches during the dark days of World War II by using language to 
prepare the public mentally for unpleasant, but real challenges before them (Sandys & 
Littman, 2003, pp. 144–146). He would then give additional speeches in the midst of the 
difficulty to keep them motivated and engaged with the survivor mindset. According to 
authors Celia Sandys and Jonathan Littman, “when things were darkest, Churchill did not 
hesitate to broadcast or address Parliament or his Cabinet” (2003, p. 144).   
Three current resources capture this concept using research based on interviews 
and studies of disaster survivors and provide insight into concepts to apply to current 
crisis communication messaging strategy. These resources include The Survivors Club 
(Sherwood, 2009), The Unthinkable (Ripley, 2008), and The Survivor Personality 
(Siebert, 2010).  
According to The Survivors Club (Sherwood, 2009), survivors of disasters 
typically display one or more of the following characteristics, each of which serves to 
counteract the shock of the impact of the disaster: 
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1. Assess what is needed 
2. See what is really there, not what they expect to see 
3. Open to possibilities—willing to think outside the box and consider 
solutions that might have been ruled out before  
4. Confident they will find a solution 
5. Persistent—they do not give up. (Green, 2011, p. 6) 
Applying this concept to the messages leaders use during all disaster phases to 
encourage and motivate the public as partners will provide another step toward enhancing 
community resilience.  
The importance of the language we use in the crisis communication system cannot 
be overlooked. According to Meadows, “Language can serve as a medium through which 
we create new understandings and new realities as we begin to talk about 
them…Language…as articulation of reality is more primordial than strategy, structure, 
or…culture” (2008, p. 174). 
The survivor psychology concept will be explored in more detail in the case study 
and analysis chapters.  
By expanding current crisis communication strategy from a during approach to 
also incorporate a before/after approach, from a parental approach to a public 
partnership approach, and including messaging for resilience using a survivor 
psychology approach, homeland security leaders will be moving toward a more engaged 
and resilient citizenry in all phases of a disaster. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Going back to the bigger picture from which this chapter started, ultimately, it is a 
shift from linear thinking to complex systems thinking that enables the development of a 
new communication framework that encompasses the concepts above and is the focus of 
this thesis. That new framework recognizes “disasters as the norm” and the need for a 
continual cycle of communication, embraces complexity, and is one of resilient 
communication. That is, communication that provides a realistic assessment of the 
potential challenges a catastrophic event can bring, offers hope and encouragement 
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during tragedy, and helps individuals and communities bounce back after experiencing 
devastation. It also engages the public as a partner before, during and after disaster, to 
help build stronger individuals and communities. 
To affect change upon the current crisis communication strategy, it is helpful to 
look for what Meadow’s Thinking in Systems book describes as “leverage points—places 
in the system where a small change could lead to a large shift in behavior” (2008, p. 145). 
The significant leverage point this thesis addresses is “paradigms—the mind-set out of 
which the system—its goals, structure, rules, delays, parameters—arises” (Meadows, 
2008, p.162). Our current paradigm is focused on addressing the “during phase” of a 
disaster. Our new paradigm should be a “before to after” focus. Our current paradigm is a 
parental approach, but our new paradigm should be a public partnership approach. Our 
current paradigm is telling the public what to do, and our new paradigm should be 
helping the public frame the disaster with survivor psychology concepts. Any one of 
these paradigms is a leverage point, which when changed, has the power to affect our 
crisis communication system positively, and the more of these leverage points we can 
affect, the more our crisis communication strategy will positively shift to become 
resilient communication. 
F. WHERE TO BEGIN PROPOSED CHANGES 
One specific place in the system to affect necessary changes to crisis 
communication strategy would be at the federal level by federal officials; however, a 
state-level approach that could be adapted to fit federal or local levels of government is a 
more realistic place to start, especially since states often resist the one size fits all federal 
approach. Therefore, using the case study of the 2007 Greensburg, Kansas tornado, this 
thesis will focus on state level changes to crisis communication strategy.  
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III. CASE STUDY: GREENSBURG  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will assess current crisis communication strategy in the U.S. by 
focusing on the state of Kansas and the approach state and local leaders used before, 
during, and after the deadly May 4, 2007 Greensburg tornado.  The purpose of this case 
study research is to answer the following questions:  
 What can we learn from communication practices surrounding the 
Greensburg tornado to assist in developing a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy that incorporates resilient messaging and 
encourages public engagement?  
 What is an appropriate crisis communications approach for homeland 
security leaders to engage the public in before, during, and after a crisis to 
enhance community resilience? 
This chapter will use an appreciative inquiry approach to Greensburg, reviewing 
what went right, which will also assist in evaluating what crisis communication approach 
would improve a future Greensburg-like scenario and enhance community resiliency.  
B. GREENSBURG—DISASTER STRIKES 
On the evening of Friday, May 4, 2007, many residents of the rural southwest 
Kansas community of Greensburg, a close-knit farming community of about 1,500, were 
going about their usual summer activities, watching their kids play ball, enjoying a family 
picnic, or finishing up their evening meal. Meteorologists had been talking about the 
potential for strong storms on radio and television throughout the day, but that was not an 
unusual forecast in Kansas in May. 
Families living in Kansas know the risk of tornados, but many storms come and 
go each year, affecting someone else, or leaving only minor damage, reaffirming the 
common belief that “it won’t happen to me.”  
We used to able to tease our children with their little fears of storms, 
‘What makes you think you are so special that a tornado would choose to 
hit you? Do you know of anyone a tornado has hit? Chances are not very 
likely,’ recalled Eric and Fern Unruh, authors of Tornado! Up From the 
Debris. (2007, p. 11) 
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On May 4, Steve Hewitt, the Greensburg City Manager was in Pratt, a town 30 
miles away, and had been hearing reports of significant storms headed toward his 
community (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). “When I hear storms come our 
way, I try to get back to my community, so me and my family hustled back to 
Greensburg,” Greensburg told the Discovery Channel. “We got to the house around 8:30 
that evening.”  
Ray Stegman, the county emergency management coordinator, was watching the 
storm closely on radar (Unruh & Unruh, 2007, p. 85). Stegman recalled that “at 9:15 
p.m., he called back to the sheriff’s office in Greensburg and told them to set off the 
tornado sirens…later he called again and told them to leave the sirens on” (Unruh & 
Unruh, 2007, p. 85). 
Hewitt recalled the moments leading up to the tornado hitting Greensburg: “I 
heard some real heavy banging noises, and I saw the baseball size hail come down,” 
Hewitt said. “I told my wife, let’s go down to the basement.’ She said, ‘just a minute,’ 
and I said, ‘you know, let’s go, and I think, let’s go now and then our ears popped,’” 
Hewitt recalled for a documentary (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009).  
“And when my ears started popping, I knew,” said Mary Merhoff, a mother of 
three, “I’ve never been in a tornado, but I knew, and I said, ‘Kids go get in the basement 
now.’ The ten steps that it took to get to my basement it was already hitting and I could 
barely get the door shut. All you could hear at that point was just what sounded like a 
wrecking ball going through your house” (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
The tornado was on the ground for more than 10 minutes as the town’s residents 
took cover in basements, under stairwells, in bathtubs, praying and waiting for it to pass. 
Lloyd Goossen was in his basement when it hit. 
Lloyd knew they were in trouble when he heard all the air sucking out of 
the house. The window and exterior-door weather stripping started 
vibrating and whistling. Then the windows broke out, and the doors 
started slamming. The noise sounded like a huge turbine winding up as 
they heard the house disintegrating above them. (Unruh & Unruh, 2007,  
p. 23)   
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Some families did not have a basement in their home, so they went to their 
neighbor’s house. One couple, Lyndon and Denise, took shelter in Larry Schmidt’s 
basement, just three minutes before the tornado hit (Unruh & Unruh, 2007, p. 53). They 
recalled the shock of finding the home above them gone, “walking up the stairs, they 
opened the door, and there was the great outdoors” (Unruh & Unruh, 2007, p. 53).  
After the tornado had passed, Hewitt heard water running into the house and went 
upstairs to find where it was coming from, thinking it was going to be a mess to clean up 
(Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). Hewitt recalled, “I look up and I see nothing 
but sky, the top of my house is gone. I look to my right, my neighbor’s house gone, to my 
left, my neighbor’s house gone. I turn around, destruction everywhere” (Planet Green, 
Discovery Channel, 2009). Soon afterward, a sheriff’s deputy told Hewitt the entire town 
was gone.  
Eleven people died that night in Kiowa County, nine of them in the town of 
Greensburg, including a man driving through town from New Mexico. A twelfth death, 
resulting from injuries that night, followed within two weeks (Kansas Adjutant General’s 
Department, 2007b).  Two more people died in the years following as a result of their 
injuries (Haney, 2009b, iii).  
More than a thousand structures in town were destroyed, with only a few homes 
left standing on the east and west side of town (Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 
2007a). Nearly every business in town was destroyed, including the schools, city hall, 
hospital, water tower, fire station, business district, and main street (Jackson, 2008).  
Many wondered why the death toll was not higher. A number of factors were 
recognized as having helped increase the survival rate. This included the warnings from 
news stations in time for the residents to take action. Meteorologists warned residents to 
take cover 20 minutes prior to the tornado touching down and some of them called the 
situation a “tornado emergency” (FEMA, 2007). Also the forecasters had been talking all 
day about potential dangerous storms by evening, so residents anticipated it and had time 
to plan to be home near shelter. Another significant factor in survival rates was  
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Greensburg residents knew what to do in a tornado. Even when they lost power and could 
not hear the meteorologists’ instructions, they still knew to get to a basement, a shelter, or 
a bathtub.   
For Greensburg residents, it was not simply the broadcast messages that 
compelled people to take action. It was a combination of factors ranging from what they 
had been taught by parents and grandparents, what they had practiced in drills at school, 
phone calls from friends, plus the weather warnings that compelled them to take life-
saving steps. 
1. Dangerous Myth: “It Won’t Happen to Me” 
The biggest challenge working against the community was the past experiences of 
residents who had seen so many severe storms pass by them, leaving them unharmed. 
Lloyd Goossen recalled telling his friend earlier in the day “the weather channel usually 
over-rated these storms” (Unruh & Unruh, 2007, p. 19).  While history had proven 
Kansas could have devastating tornados, it had been 42 years since a community had 
experienced a tornado that destroyed a community. This occurred in the town of Udall in 
1955 with 82 deaths (no weather warning was issued) (Finger, 2011). Other severe 
tornados had left a deadly path since then including a 1966 tornado in Topeka, which 
killed 16, and a 1991 tornado in Andover with 19 deaths (Finger, 2011). 
The years between each deadly tornado event and the distance between these 
towns gave Kansans time to forget and to rationalize by thinking “it won’t happen to 
me.”  
Some Greensburg residents chose not to heed the warnings to take shelter in 
basements or storm shelters and lost their lives. This included Randy Kelly’s mother, 
Evelyn. “If God wants to take me, He will,” she had told friends that day (Unruh & 
Unruh, 2007, p. 27). Some elderly individuals found it difficult to get to a storm shelter or 
basement so they turned down offers also. Colleen Panzer was one of those. She suffered 
head injuries and died on a helicopter in route to the hospital (Unruh & Unruh, 2007,  
p. 120). Norman and Beverly Volz were at home with her father, Max McColm. They 
tried to take shelter but did not have time and got into the hallway (Unruh & Unruh, 
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2007, p. 120).  The tornado hurled a large sheet of metal through the house hitting 
Beverly and Max. Beverly died that night, and her father, died several months later from 
his injuries (Unruh & Unruh 2007, p. 148). Others, like Emma Hargadine, recall, “I had 
ignored going to the safety of my nearest neighbor’s basement” (Haney, 2009a, p. 4).  
She was lucky and made it out alive.  
2. Local Leadership Impacted by Tornado 
City administrator Steve Hewitt made sure his wife and baby were safe and then 
began to check on the community around him (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
First responders from surrounding towns were coming to the rescue of the town because 
many of Greensburg’s emergency response vehicles and its hospital had been destroyed 
by the tornado (Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 2007e).  
State officials had been monitoring the storm from the State Emergency 
Operation Center in Topeka throughout the evening and began getting calls around 10 
p.m., indicating this tornado had taken out most of the town (Kansas Adjutant General’s 
Department, 2007e). 
“We had never had a community where everyone with any significant role to play 
in that community had been impacted,” said Maj. Gen. Tod Bunting, Adjutant General 
and Director of Kansas Division of Emergency Management, during a recorded interview 
for the Kansas Adjutant General’s Department on September 21, 2010.   
Even when I got to Greensburg as the sun came up that Saturday morning, 
I don’t think anyone could understand that there was literally no one from 
Greensburg in any capacity to really sit down as the incident commander 
or to truly make all of the decisions that needed to be made at that 
moment. In all of our training you never envision that you go somewhere 
where there isn’t someone (who could lead the response), Bunting said. 
(Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 2010) 
Bunting, through his department’s State Emergency Operation Center, began 
sending state resources just after midnight, including communications support and a team 
to serve as the incident command (Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 2007e). With 
approximately 90 percent of the community destroyed, local officials needed the support 
to carry out basic operations (Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 2007e).  
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Hewitt was the most active local leader engaging in the decision-making 
processes in the hours and days after the tornado. He worked with state and federal 
officials on the next steps for the town. 
3. Media Arrive from Across Kansas and the Nation 
Local media as well as media from Wichita, about 80 miles away, and 
surrounding communities began arriving not long after the tornado hit. Hewitt began 
talking to the media telling them what was happening with search and rescue operations 
and the residents of the town.  
“We’ll just continue to do what we can to try to find everybody who’s out there 
who may be trapped and we’ll do our best,” Hewitt said. “We’ll begin evacuating the 
community and we will not let anybody into the community until we know it’s safe for 
residents” (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009).   
By the next day (May 5), early in the afternoon, national media were beginning to 
arrive and their media trucks would eventually fill up a two block long section of town. 
Both Hewitt and Bunting went before the news media frequently, describing the 
extent of the damage to the infrastructure of the town. Hewitt explained to the media and 
public what crews were doing to rescue individuals who might still be in the rubble and 
asked residents to remain patient while crews made it safe for them to return (Planet 
Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
Hewitt and Bunting followed the communication guidelines recommended by 
FEMA, explaining what had happened, what they were doing about it as government 
officials, and what the public should be doing (Potter, Wistrom, Griekspoor, & Laviana, 
2007). They gave their assessment of what the tornado had done to Greensburg’s homes, 
businesses, power and water systems; how local and state officials were addressing the 
problems; and what the public should do to stay safe and get information (Potter et al., 
2007).  
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4. Leadership Reframed the Greensburg Disaster  
In the early hours of the disaster, the focus of the leadership and the media was on 
search and rescue. By Sunday afternoon when search and rescue drew to an end, Bunting, 
Hewitt, and Greensburg Mayor Lonnie McCollum, known for the stars and stripes 
baseball cap he wore, began talking more about the future of Greensburg and rebuilding 
(Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). The local and state leaders knew the town and 
its people had a long road ahead of them.  
“The city as far as our utilities and our infrastructure, we just lost everything,” 
McCollum told the Discovery Channel (2009). He explained, “The city has absolutely 
zero resources left, so there goes our income. We don’t have a way to generate any 
income. Ninety-five percent of our homes, our buildings are destroyed.  Our folks are 
homeless, so things they’ve worked hard for their whole life have all been blown away” 
(Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
“Almost immediately, key leaders in the community saw the potential to frame 
the disaster positively for its residents…‘The tornado had a silver lining, for it made this 
town and some 1,400 people regroup and reinvent itself,’” Hewitt said (Seeger, Sellnow, 
& Ulmer, 2010, p. 141). 
“We plan on everybody coming, back, okay, that’s our goal, number one,” Hewitt 
told community members at a town meeting (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
“We can’t walk away from this,” McCollom said at the same meeting (Planet Green, 
Discovery Channel, 2009). “We’re not gonna walk away. We’re gonna build a brand new 
town, no matter what it takes” (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
Hewitt focused his attention on how to make an even better Greensburg than it 
had been before the tornado. He looked for new businesses, worked to keep the previous 
businesses in Greensburg, and inquired into making the town a “green community,” with 
buildings built using environmentally friendly materials (Seeger et al., 2010, p. 142).  
Leadership recognized the importance of the school in the town’s future. Darin 
Headrick, the school superintendent, was like the other leaders in town who had lost their  
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home. “Towns are about people, they are not about building. And it’s a huge opportunity 
to rebuild - not just rebuild it the way it was, but maybe rebuild it a bit better than it was,” 
Headrick said (Seeger et al., 2010, p. 141). 
Like many rural Kansas towns, Greensburg’s population had been declining for 
many years as students left for college and did not return. Hewitt was concerned about 
this dwindling population and saw it as an opportunity in the disaster (Seeger et al., 2010, 
p. 141). One teenager, Levi Schmidt, said after the tornado that the tornado and the 
community’s rebuilding effort had changed his mind about returning to Greensburg after 
college (Seeger et al., 2010, p. 141). “Now I’m definitely coming back, and I know a 
majority of my friends are,” he said (Seeger et al., 2010, p. 141). 
Bunting knew the importance of the language he and the other leaders used and 
the power it had to compel Greensburg residents to envision a rebuilt town.  Some of this 
knowledge stemmed from his research into resiliency programs to improve the outcome 
of National Guard members and disaster responders facing extremely difficult challenges 
in war and response efforts (Kansas Adjutant General Department, 2009). Using what he 
was learning about resiliency, he talked about the future.  
Hewitt provided similar uplifting messages to the community.   
“We'll rebuild,” said Greensburg City Administrator Steve Hewitt, who lost his 
home. “It’ll take time, but we’ll rebuild this city” (Potter et al., 2007).  
“I see a community coming together. I see a future here. I really do,” Hewitt said 
(Hegeman, 2007b). 
The school superintendent also joined in to the efforts to establish a vision for the 
future. “Our teachers will have jobs; our kids will have classrooms to attend,” he 
(Headrick) said (Hegeman, 2007b). 
Together and individually, Hewitt, Headrick, McCollum, and Bunting 
communicated their vision for a better Greensburg to the many local and national news 
media on hand until the media began to scrutinize the disaster response efforts of the  
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Kansas National Guard. This scrutiny started Sunday evening (May 6) when the governor 
arrived for a news conference and her comments shifted the focus off of the recovery 
efforts into a political debate. 
5. Political Fray Changes Focus of Communication 
Just months prior to the Greensburg tornado, Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius 
had raised concerns about Kansas National Guard equipment left overseas during military 
deployments. Although the equipment would eventually be returned, or replaced with 
new equipment, this took time. It also meant the equipment was not in the state for use 
when disaster hit, so Sebelius expressed concern this had affected the Guard’s response to 
Greensburg: 
We’re missing about half of our trucks from the National Guard units,” 
Sebelius said. “Clearly trucks to haul this debris away would be 
enormously helpful. We are missing flatbeds. We are missing humvees, 
which are used to get people to safety and security and to haul equipment 
around. We are missing a number of our well-trained National Guard 
personnel. The equipment that we continue to harp on that has been sent 
overseas when our troops are deployed and not restored at the same level 
could be enormously helpful. (Hegeman, 2007b) 
Sebelius’s comments became a hot new topic of debate, drawing 24/7 news 
coverage, and rising to a national debate between the governor and the White House 
(CNN, 2007). This public discourse over whether the Guard had the equipment it needed 
to respond to the devastating tornado shifted the focus of the media from the rescue and 
clean up of the disaster to the political concerns of the governor regarding National Guard 
equipment (Vu, 2007). The perception that the Guard did not have the equipment it 
needed to respond then prompted many offers of assistance from other states and active 
duty military (Vu, 2007) and the White House:  
White House spokesman Tony Snow said Monday the National Guard has 
stockpiles of equipment stashed around country for emergencies. “The 
administration is doing whatever it can. If there's a need for equipment, it 
will arrive.” (CNN, 2007) 
The debate was polarized further because Sebelius was a Democrat and President 
George W. Bush a Republican. Support and objections expressed by the two political 
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sides of the aisle across the country increased the attention on the National Guard 
equipment issue and kept the debate alive for several days (Saulny & Rutenburg, 2007).  
6. Media Rumors to Dispel 
Another challenge resulted Sunday, May 6, when four active duty military 
members from Fort Riley, Kansas, pretended to be Kansas National Guard members and 
were allowed into Greensburg where they began to loot items from the local grocery store 
that had been demolished by the tornado (Hegeman, 2007a). 
Media incorrectly reported the men were Kansas Guardsmen. Bunting became 
concerned about the public’s trust in the hundreds of Guard members he had deployed to 
work throughout the town of Greensburg to help with the clean-up efforts and spoke 
about the arrests to reporters (Associated Press, 2007). Despite efforts by the National 
Guard to correct news stories that were falsely identifying the men as Guard members, 
the incorrect information continued to be distributed by some regional and national media 
outlets for several days.  
Media members scrambled to find heroic stories of individuals who had survived 
days in the rubble, and in their haste, reporters incorrectly reported that an individual had 
been rescued from his basement. He had actually gone back to his home to look around, 
prior to when residents were allowed to return (CNN, 2007).   
7. Rebuilding Public Trust  
One of the most challenging media topics in the aftermath of the tornado for 
leadership to address was the debate over a slow Kansas Guard response. Numerous 
media requests came to Bunting after the governor’s Sunday evening news conference. 
Reporters asked Bunting to explain Governor Sebelius’s comments on a slow National 
Guard response (CNN, 2007). Recognizing the public trust in the Kansas Guard members 
in the town was at stake, Bunting and his leadership devoted time over the next two days 
to talk to reporters from across the country explaining the status of Guard equipment and 
its impact on Greensburg (CNN, 2007). They explained how some of the Guard 
equipment currently overseas would have been helpful in transporting equipment for 
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debris cleanup, but that the Guard was not involved in the search and rescue efforts 
(CNN, 2007). This was a key point in the debate because it reduced the criticality of 
getting to Greensburg a few hours sooner.  
The political debate carried on while Greensburg residents watched Guard 
members, along with other state and local organizations, remove debris from their 
community and help with rebuilding some city projects. 
Hewitt and Headrick continued to keep the focus of their messages to the media 
and public on the future of Greensburg attempting to assure the public the school would 
be open by the fall semester (Hegeman, 2007b). They encouraging residents to make 
plans to rebuild in Greensburg rather than move away to another school district 
(Hegeman, 2007b).   
8. Public as a Partner  
Since the night of the tornado, residents of the community had been evacuated 
and kept out of the town for their safety. Many went to a local shelter in the nearby town 
of Haviland, while others stayed with family or friends. On Monday, May 7, residents 
were allowed back into the community to search for belongings in and around their 
homes. President George W. Bush arrived on Wednesday, May 9 offering words of hope 
and encouragement to the devastated town (Hegeman, 2007b). He had also promised 
ongoing federal help a few days before his arrival (Hegeman, 2007b). 
“We’ll help in any way we can...There’s a certain spirit in the Midwest of our 
country, a pioneer spirit that still exists, and I’m confident this community will be 
rebuilt,” Bush said (Hegeman, 2007b). 
Numerous community meetings were held in the first few weeks after the tornado 
to get the public’s input and ensure awareness of and support for the decisions being 
made about the future of the town (Seeger et al., 2010, p. 141). Unfortunately, the 
challenge of rebuilding a home and an entire town was too much for some residents, and 
they decided to relocate permanently.  
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In a surprise move, the Greensburg mayor, Lonnie McCullom, who had been a 
key public motivator in the days and weeks after the tornado, determined that his role in 
rebuilding the town would be too much stress for him and for his wife, so he resigned just 
a few weeks after the tornado hit and moved away” (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 
2009).  
“There was a tremendously good life for me there,” McCollum told producers of a 
Discovery Channel documentary. “And I think after the tornado, the first three or four 
weeks, I was like, ‘boy, we got a big problem here. Isn’t it gonna be fun solving?’ I was 
thinking ‘boy, if we do this, this, and this and we just commit long and hard enough we’ll 
fix this thing’” (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
Hewitt continued to carry on the role of motivating the community by framing the 
disaster as an opportunity.  He saw the public as partners in the process of rebuilding 
their lives, homes, and community” (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). Moreover, 
he encouraged them to dream big and consider rebuilding the town environmentally 
friendly with high standard certification of buildings” (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 
2009).  
“Maybe it’s a little bit crazy. There are only 14 platinum buildings in the country. 
When it’s all said and done, I’d like 4 or 5 here in Greensburg,” Hewitt said (Seeger et 
al., 2010, p. 142).  
“When you talk about the environment, that is what Kansas is about,” Hewitt said. 
“What’s more green than agriculture?” (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
Bunting assured residents the state resources and National Guard would stay as 
long as needed and kept that promise with a total of 1,400 of his troops serving in 
Greensburg during the two months following the disaster (Kansas Adjutant General’s 
Department, 2007d). He worked closely with state and federal officials trying to find 
ways to go beyond what had been done in past disasters because of the extensive 
devastation caused by this disaster (Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 2007c).  
When Governor Sebelius toured the devastation of Greensburg, she talked about 
the resilient people of Kansas encouraging residents to be strong and thanking the nation 
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for support (Barr, 2007). Bunting carried this message of resiliency to the residents also 
and continued to reference the disaster as yet another example of how Kansans have 
bounced back from tremendous challenges (Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 
2009).  “Through the tough times, we’ve seen how strong Kansans are and how resilient 
they are despite incredible destruction and loss,” he said (Kansas Adjutant General’s 
Department, 2009). 
9. Greensburg: A “Black Swan” from Which to Learn 
Greensburg was a black swan:  
 Something history made difficult to predict,  
 But retroactively predictable, and  
 Something involving random, unlikely and unexpected events. (Fora.tv, 
2010) 
Greensburg was “difficult to predict” because historically tornados affect only a 
portion of a community, as occurred when an EF-3 hit Reading, Kansas on May 21, 
2011, and when the EF5 tornado hit Joplin, Missouri on May 22, 2011 (Kansas Adjutant 
General’s Department, 2011a). When an entire town is destroyed, in a rural area, with all 
of the leadership personally affected, the challenges ahead are overwhelming for those 
whose lives, homes, and community were uprooted in a 15 minute period.  
Greensburg was “retroactively predictable” because it had happened 52 years 
earlier in Udall, Kansas, but those who remembered lessons learned from that 1955 storm 
were not leading the state response or the local response in Greensburg (Bunting and 
Hewitt were both born after 1955). Also so much had changed since the Udall tornado 
regarding technology and weather warnings, that it was not often referenced in state 
planning discussions. Instead lessons from a more recent storm, the Andover tornado of 
1991, often came up in tornado planning discussions in Kansas (Finger, 2011). 
Greensburg involved “random, unlikely and unexpected” events, all aspects of 
Taleb’s “black swan” characterization (Fora.tv, 2010). The fact that the mayor and city 
administrator were personally affected by losing their homes, trying to take care of their 
spouses and children, and still reeling over the sheer loss of everything not only in their 
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home, but their entire town was unlikely.  Also, the political debate over National Guard 
equipment escalating from a street corner news conference on a Sunday night in 
Greensburg to a national debate involving the White House spokesman Monday was 
unexpected. The issue of active duty military members blending in with hundreds of 
Guardsmen to steal from the community was a random event.   
These random, unlikely, unexpected, but very real events of the 2007 Greensburg 
tornado make it a valuable black swan to study for improving our nation, state, and local 
crisis communication strategy.  
C. CRISIS COMMUNICATION EFFORTS BEFORE THE GREENSBURG 
TORNADO 
Crisis communication efforts in Kansas prior to the Greensburg tornado involved 
numerous different entities. The efforts were not part of a specific local or state crisis 
communication strategy, but worked well based on the way the public responded.  
Fortunately, Kansas residents are taught from a young age about the dangers of 
tornadoes the Midwest presents. These messages begin with regularly scheduled school 
drills requiring children to take cover. Broadcast meteorologists frequently remind 
residents throughout the year when and where to take cover, whether at home or in a car.  
And finally, sirens blare in communities as a last warning symbol indicating action 
should be taken before it is too late.  
The primary local and state government messages prior to the Greensburg tornado 
involved the governor’s office and Kansas Division of Emergency Management 
promoting a spring and fall awareness week annually. Every spring, Severe Weather 
Awareness week involves the governor signing a proclamation encouraging Kansans to 
stay alert to the dangers of severe storms (Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 2012). 
In addition, a similar day is promoted in September on which the governor signs a 
proclamation promoting Kansas Preparedness Month and encourages families to follow 
the FEMA recommendations of getting a kit, having a plan, and staying aware (Kansas 
Adjutant General’s Department, 2008).  News releases are sent statewide to media to 
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generate news stories and increase awareness of the dangers of storms in Kansas 
(Tongonoxie Mirror, 2011).  
Tornados are ranked in the top two dangers Kansans may face in the state risk 
assessment (Kansas Adjutant General’s Department, 2011b).  Exercise scenarios and 
drills are conducted at the state and local level, requiring officials to anticipate how to 
respond to the aftermath of a tornado or other high risk. Occasionally, these exercises are 
announced to media and news stories result reminding Kansans of the need to prepare for 
specific disasters and participate in statewide drills (Kansas Adjutant General’s 
Department, 2012). 
Fortunately, on May 4, meteorologists had been warning of the potential for 
tornadoes early in the day. Residents had time to modify their evening plans based on 
storm predictions. Many families were together. And they also had 20 minutes of 
warnings including sirens blaring as a final reminder to take cover. Ultimately, danger 
was communicated to the residents, most of them heeded the warning, and some of them 
even planned in advance to go to a relative or friend’s house knowing they did not have a 
good location to remain safe. In many cases these decisions to follow the guidance given 
meant the difference between life and death. In a few cases, individuals were just lucky 
despite ignoring warnings or, unlucky, despite their best efforts depending on where they 
were when the tornado hit.  
In addition to the messages presented on May 4, the preparedness messages 
coming from schools and media (including meteorologists) as well as political officials 
and state and local emergency management officials throughout the year likely helped 
increase residents’ awareness of what to do in the Greensburg tornado.  
In many ways, Greensburg served as a model of community preparedness on the 
night of May 4, 2007: residents looked out for one another, made plans, helped those 
without the necessary safe area to go, and took the necessary actions when warned.  The 
results: 10 deaths in a community of approximately 1,500 instead of the 200 deaths first 
responders had initially anticipated when they requested hundreds of body bags (Finger, 
2008).   
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1. What Could Have Been Better Regarding Crisis Communication 
Efforts Before the Greensburg Tornado? 
Despite all that went right, there was unfortunately a common and deadly myth 
that persisted: “it won’t happen to me.” This happened to individuals as well as local and 
state leaders who did not anticipate such a horrible incident could happen in their town. 
This “failure of imagination” was identified as a key reason officials across the country 
did not see the warning signs addressed throughout the 9/11 Commission Report, and it 
applies to disasters like Greensburg as well (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 2004). 
Long before a disaster, the public and leadership must fight against this “failure of 
imagination,” this desire to believe that disaster cannot happen to an individual or a 
community. Residents in Greensburg and leaders in Greensburg had to overcome this 
during and after the tornado hit, but, with a comprehensive crisis communication 
strategy to address this, messages from state and local leaders could have guided 
residents to change their mindset about disasters before they happen, helping them to 
expect the unexpected, and better plan for the worst-case scenario. 
D. CRISIS COMMUNICATION EFFORTS DURING GREENSBURG 
TORNADO  
Crisis communication efforts in the “during” or “event” phase of the tornado were 
consistent with the state’s crisis communication strategy outlined in the Kansas Response 
Plan (2011b) as well as with risk communication principles included in FEMA (2009) 
and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention training (CDC, 2005).  
The messages communicated the morning after the tornado came from first 
responders, first Hewitt and later Bunting. They told the media what they were finding as 
daylight began to reveal the full extent of the damage (Hegeman, 2007b). They used risk 
communication principles developed in recent years by Vincent Covello, as well as 
FEMA and CDC officials. This involved communicating frequently with media in the 
first several days, providing regular updates as things changed, and discussing what 
government was doing and how the public could help and stay informed. This guidance is 
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included in FEMA public information officer training materials (2009) and CDC risk 
communication training for public information officers (2005).  
Although the political debate over National Guard equipment took center stage 
for a couple of days, local, and state officials continued to provide updates. They worked 
closely with local media to ensure residents understood what was happening to the town, 
which remained closed off to the public through Monday morning, May 7 (Hegeman, 
2007b). As residents were allowed to return to their homes to begin clean up, state and 
local public information officers created flyers to hand out and recorded messages on a 
local radio transmitter set up within the city limits to keep residents informed. All of 
these actions followed the guidance of the Kansas Response Plan Emergency Support 
Function 15 external affairs appendix and assisted in keeping the public informed.  
1. What Could Have Been Better Regarding Crisis Communication 
Efforts During the Greensburg Tornado? 
The crisis communication efforts occurring during Greensburg provides an 
excellent example of a complex system.  Messages from state and local government to 
media represent the linear model upon which most crisis communication efforts are 
based. By focusing on this portion only, crisis communication strategy overlooks the 
messages politics may add to the situation as occurred in Greensburg with the National 
Guard debate. In addition, it overlooks how the media’s coverage including rumors and 
other stories may affect the public and change the course of the day’s messages. It also 
overlooks public reaction to political messages, government messages and media 
coverage.  
By developing a crisis communication strategy using a complex systems 
approach, which accounts for the dynamic environment of government, politics, media 
and the public, leaders would be in a better position to anticipate the many challenges 
each quadrant of this crisis communication system may present. This strategic effort 
could assist in keeping the important messages in the forefront as other issues arose. 
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E. CRISIS COMMUNICATION EFFORTS AFTER GREENSBURG 
TORNADO  
Crisis communication efforts after the tornado did not follow a specific state or 
local crisis communication strategy, but it did go well primarily due to the local and state 
leadership of local leaders like Hewitt, Headrick, McCollum, and state leaders like 
Bunting.  
These leaders communicated a vision for the future of residents in Greensburg, 
and offered them hope. They used language specifically addressing a resilient recovery 
and discussing those in the past in Kansas who had overcome great challenges. This 
message was delivered consistently by local and state officials, and later by President 
Bush, when he arrived on May 9.  
Bunting and Hewitt used two important concepts in their approach and their 
messages following the Greensburg tornado: public partnership and survivor psychology.  
Their messages addressed the public as key partners in the rebuilding of their 
lives and their community, rather than that government officials who were there to save 
the day. Each explained that it was going to be difficult and they would help. They 
encouraged residents to be strong and to remember their forefathers who had built lives 
from the open prairie, and they offered hope to move forward.  
Both Hewitt and Bunting, having never met prior to the disaster, seemed to have 
the same understanding regarding messages of resilience. Unknowingly they followed 
concepts recommended in survivor psychology in their communication and their 
approach to rebuilding Greensburg. The survivor psychology concept includes assessing 
what is needed, seeing what is really there, being open, confident, and persistent (Green, 
2011, p. 6) 
As Hewitt and Bunting spoke of the future of Greensburg numerous times a day, 
whether to media or individuals or government officials, they helped the public envision 
a future and framed it with hope.  They also took action to support their messages like 
working with federal officials to quickly remove debris, set up temporary housing, begin 
discussions for rebuilding the school and have it open for a fall 2007 start.  
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1. What Could Have Been Better Regarding Crisis Communication 
Efforts After the Greensburg Tornado?    
Bunting and Hewitt did not follow a specific plan or script for their messages, and 
had the two of them not been a key part of the response and recovery, Greensburg might 
not look as it does today with 900 residents staying in the community, a new school, and 
many businesses, as well as the use of some of the most advanced technology and 
environmentally-friendly buildings in the country (Planet Green, Discovery Channel, 
2009).  A comprehensive crisis communication strategy incorporating the concept of 
public partnership and survivor psychology to assist those leaders who do not normally 
think as Bunting and Hewitt did is essential. In addition, because current crisis 
communication strategy does not address the phase well after a disaster, there were a 
number of missed opportunities in the months and years following Greensburg.  These 
included strategic efforts to tell stories of survival and how public preparedness and 
decisive action assisted in reducing the number of deaths, discussing with residents, the 
media, and government what went right and what went wrong, as well as how response 
will be done differently in the future.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Many things went right in Greensburg. The residents, along with local and state 
leaders, each had a key role in the survival of the people and their town before, during, 
and after the tornado. The actions individuals took before the tornado by heeding 
warnings and doing what they had been taught to do helped to minimize loss of life. The 
actions of the local and state leadership in the moments, days, and weeks following the 
tornado helped frame the disaster in a positive way, helping residents and the public to 
see a possible future for themselves and their community, despite the incredible loss 
suffered.  
The crisis communication efforts before, during, and after the Greensburg tornado 
reveal the need for a comprehensive crisis communication strategy that develops 
approaches for the before and after phases of a crisis, and enhances the during phase 
using a complex systems approach rather than a linear approach. 
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Using specific themes and messages in each phase of the crisis, especially the 
before and after phases, phases which have not been emphasized in the past, will improve 
leadership’s understanding and implementation of this comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy.  
Chapter IV further analyzes the actions of the public and the leadership, assessing 
what could be improved for the next Greensburg-like scenario in Kansas. 
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IV. ANALYSIS  
This chapter analyzes what happened in Greensburg and how developing a 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for all phases of the disaster, with an 
emphasis on resilient messaging, would improve preparedness, response, and recovery; 
and community resiliency.   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Lack of a focus on a crisis communication strategy well before and long after a 
crisis is a missed opportunity for homeland security leaders. A pre-disaster 
communication strategy would help officials establish public expectations that disasters 
are a serious threat and will happen, while also working to debunk the myth of “it won’t 
happen to me.” A post-disaster communication strategy would help officials develop and 
use language to frame a different public mindset to deal with disasters when they happen. 
In addition, it would allow homeland security leaders to help the public understand what 
worked and did not work in previous disasters and what improvements would be applied 
next time, as well as what role public preparedness played in the response and recovery. 
Not only are key strategic opportunities missed with the current strategy, but the 
current crisis communication guidance overlooks the need for themes and messages of 
resilience to be included before, during, and after a crisis. Ideally, crisis communication 
strategy would incorporate resilient messaging, which are messages targeted to help the 
public realistically understand their disaster risk. It would also incorporate the need to 
plan appropriately for those risks and the criticality of maintaining a survivor mindset 
when the disaster hits.  
Incorporating the above steps into a comprehensive crisis communication strategy 
would help compel the public to adopt an enhanced readiness mindset regarding 
disasters. 
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B. GREENSBURG “BEFORE” PHASE 
Crisis communication guidance available for government officials to use in 
Greensburg focused on communication practices leaders should take immediately before 
disaster, during, and immediately after a disaster, rather than actions needed long before 
and long after the crisis. By focusing on the moments surrounding the disaster, many 
opportunities are missed to engage the public in the time periods between disasters.  
Despite this problem, local and state officials were fortunate for a number of 
reasons:  
1. Kansans generally know what to do in a tornado due to practicing drills 
throughout childhood in school, then later as adults at work or when 
taking cover for actual storm warnings.  
2. Kansas meteorologists and government officials discuss and show the 
devastating results of the dangers of tornados throughout the year.  
3. Greensburg residents knew of the dangers early that day and also received 
a 20-minute warning before the tornado hit with sirens blaring.  
4. After the tornado, local and state leaders focused on communicating hope 
and ensuring a resilient recovery.  
If any of these factors had not existed, such as the familiar type of disaster, the 
pre-education and warnings, or the specific leaders involved, the results might have been 
dramatically different. Excluding the loss of life, the town’s residents were very fortunate 
for the convergence of these factors. But relying on a streak of luck for the next disaster 
is not a good strategy in crisis communication and steps should be taken to improve the 
status quo. 
1. Changing Strategy in the “Before” Phase: Using a Complex Systems 
Approach 
Crisis communication guidance has traditionally followed a linear model that 
consists of a deceptively simple formula, which asks, “How can government best 
communicate a message to media regarding a crisis or potential crisis?” Homeland 
security leaders must understand crisis communication no longer falls into this simple 
model. They must also understand how message senders and recipients are “locked in a 
relationship of simultaneous, mutual interdependence,” as described by the pragmatic 
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complexity model developed by the Consortium for Strategic Communication at Arizona 
State University (Corman et al., 2007, p. 10). In other words, leaders must acknowledge 
how their messages influence various parts of the crisis communication system, and how 
other parts of the crisis communication system influence messages, by adding different 
interpretations and new messages.  
The pragmatic complexity model provides a more realistic viewpoint of disaster 
communication and should be incorporated into comprehensive crisis communication 
strategy. This model recommends leaders “de-emphasize control,” rely on “variations on 
a message theme,” anticipate “disruption,” and “plan for failure” with a good contingency 
plan (Corman, et al., 2007, pp. 12–14). 
By reviewing the case study, Greensburg can be considered an example of 
successful communication in the “before” phase of a crisis. This is because of the 
messages on the dangers of tornados delivered from a variety of different sectors in the 
complex crisis communication system (i.e., government (emergency response leaders), 
politicians, the public (including family and friends), and the media (including weather 
forecasters). The consistent messages encouraged preparedness and strongly reinforced 
each other. 
Tornados in Kansas are a believable threat, so the danger is addressed often by 
each of these sectors of society. Greensburg residents would have heard about the 
dangers of tornados from childhood with preparedness messages frequently 
communicated by parents as well as meteorologists on television and radio, and the 
preparedness actions would have been reinforced through required drills and exercises at 
school and work. Residents who had lived in Greensburg or the Midwest for a while 
would have also likely taken precautions for tornados that had passed by their community 
before. All of these factors helped persuade Kansans to pay more attention to the 
warnings and proactively take cover as the threat of the tornado was bearing down on the 
town.  
Unfortunately, none of the community messaging was included in a 
comprehensive local or state-level crisis communication strategy with a before, during, 
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and after emphasis. The messaging simply happened throughout the parts of the complex 
crisis communication system because of the common threat of dangerous tornados in 
Kansas, not because of a strategy or communication guidance. Therefore, if it had been a 
different type of disaster, Greensburg residents might not have been fortunate enough to 
know what steps to take.  For that reason, it is important to note that while Kansans 
responded well to the tornado preparedness messaging and threat, they could not be 
expected to respond as well to other less common threats to the state, such as an 
earthquake or a terrorist threat. 
Another successful communication effort to consider in the “before” phase of 
Greensburg is the increased effectiveness of messages when they are provided by 
multiple sources.  Providing unified messages on what to do before a tornado from 
government officials, elected officials, media, and public (including family), increased 
the credibility of the messages, which is a key crisis communication principle (CDC, 
2002a, p. 23).  
Using Greensburg as a model from which to develop a comprehensive strategy for 
the before phase of a disaster reveals the need for leaders to communicate about disasters 
on a regular basis. This communication would need to include messages to ensure the 
public that disasters will happen and can be devastating, messages explaining the need for 
public preparedness, and then take it a step beyond this to ensure similar messages are 
coming from different parts of the crisis communication system as occurred in 
Greensburg.  
When developing crisis communication strategy, homeland security leaders must 
first consider how to best understand and use all parts of the complex crisis 
communication system to get preparedness messages out to the public effectively on a 
variety of threats. Messages are more effective when provided by numerous sources, and 
move beyond the linear communication model used in current crisis communication 
guidance (primarily government officials to media).  
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2. Shifting “It Won’t Happen to Me” Thinking to “It Will Happen To 
Me” Thinking in the “Before” Phase 
Based on the Greensburg case study, one mindset that leaders must work to 
change before a disaster is the public’s mindset of “it won’t happen to me.”  Researchers 
including David Ropeik, former Harvard professor and author of How Risky Is It, Really? 
(2010), describe this idea as “optimism bias,” which causes individuals to believe 
disasters can happen to someone else but not to them. This cognitive error is based on 
how we learn. Author and researcher Robert Meyer explains “We have developed strong 
instincts to learn things by trial and error, avoiding actions (or inactions) that yield bad 
outcomes and repeating those that yield good ones” (2006, p. 155). Therefore, if we have 
not needed to take special precautions against a deadly tornado or hurricane in the past, or 
we have not been directly impacted by past threats, optimism bias reinforces we will 
survive without taking precautions in the future.   
Research conducted during the past five years offers homeland security leaders 
more effective ways to overcome this “optimism bias.”  Researchers Passyn, Luce, and 
Kahn (2005) found communication messages that appeal to individual regret are more 
likely to increase compliance in a desired behavior than messages of fear, which cause 
recipients of the message to turn away. According to Meyer, “The regret appeal seemed 
to work in this context because it heightened senses of personal responsibility for 
preventive action while at the same time being unthreatening—hence allowing the 
content of the message to be processed” (2006, p. 172). 
Using this research, homeland security leaders would be wise to talk routinely 
about personally witnessing the impact of disaster on residents of their state or 
community, including the shared regret of those who did not prepare.  To strengthen their 
message, individuals negatively impacted by disasters could be encouraged by state or 
local leaders to talk about those regrets publically, influencing individuals otherwise 
likely to discount a disaster ever happening to them. For example, an emergency manager 
could ask a recent survivor of a tornado or flood to speak at a news conference or a 
community meeting about how preparedness measures could have made a difference or 
did make a difference. Emergency managers could also work with schools and churches 
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to present the same message, asking disaster survivors from the community to tell their 
story. Incorporating this type of systematic and targeted messaging into the local and 
state crisis communication strategy would increase public awareness and help reduce the 
“it won’t happen to me” belief by presenting individuals from a local community to 
refute that wrong and dangerous perception.  
Another way of overcoming “it won’t happen to me” thinking is in the advice of 
psychologist Daniel Gilbert, who suggests we “think about the future as if it were 
tomorrow, which leads to more realistic judgments about how things might turn out” 
(Ropeik, 2010, p. 10).  This requires homeland security leaders to construct their 
messages carefully in ways the public envisions a crisis occurring to them tomorrow not 
next week or next year. This will enhance the target audiences’ likelihood of taking 
precautionary measures. 
Additional research conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s found that 
optimism bias could more likely be overcome by providing messages with specifics of 
how to avoid a likely or specific hazard rather than the more general messages, such as 
the all-hazards “generic catch-all lists where only a subset of precautions would be seen 
as relevant to any one decision maker” (Meyer, 2006), p. 171).  For example, specific 
information on protecting oneself from a local hazard, such as a hurricane, could prove 
more effective than information about an emergency kit list applying to numerous 
disasters.  
Homeland security leaders must use messages and strategies to change the “it 
won’t happen to me” mindset to one that helps the public imagine “it will happen to me,” 
and, furthermore, that a disaster could even happen tomorrow. Leaders must 
communicate in ways the listener visualizes being affected by disaster individually, and 
sooner rather than later. 
3. Using a Public Partnership Approach in “Before” Phase of Crisis 
Communication Strategy 
Fortunately, Greensburg residents were well aware of the critical role they could 
play in saving their life and the lives of others by taking specific actions before a tornado 
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hits. Firsthand accounts reveal this awareness came about as residents repeatedly heard 
about deadly tornadoes in the media, having experienced near misses in Kansas 
communities, being told of the dangers of not preparing, and the importance of taking 
responsibility for one’s own safety.  
In other Kansas and U.S. crises, there is hesitancy by homeland security leaders to 
provide messages considered too negative or too blunt to the public before a crisis 
happens because leaders fear the public will panic and overreact or there will be political 
repercussions.  This became evident in the years leading up to the 2009 pandemic flu 
preparations and discussions across the country as officials hesitated to discuss in the 
media issues like a possible shortage of ventilators, which could result in doctors 
choosing who would live and who would die. One exception was the city of New York, 
which formed a work group to develop a plan that was released for public comment 
(Roos, 2007).  Many homeland security leaders dared not publically discuss this likely 
because of the high political pressure that would result.  Ironically, in these scenarios, 
homeland security leaders mirror the same dangerous “optimism bias” as civilians 
choosing to hope that any event will not happen on their watch versus taking actions 
appropriate in accordance with their responsibilities.   
The dilemma of withholding difficult information exists for the nation in the 
communication about a possible nuclear detonation or dirty bombs in the U.S.  FEMA 
and a number of other agencies have prepared a document called Nuclear Detonation 
Preparedness, Communicating in the Immediate Aftermath (2010) for use after such a 
device is activated. However, there is little emphasis on messaging before it happens to 
ensure the public takes the appropriate steps when or if it does (Office of the President, 
2010). Homeland security leaders are choosing to accept the risk of dealing with the 
chaos that could erupt from the public not understanding dirty bombs, rather than 
proactively explaining the effects of dirty bombs and what the public can do to minimize 
their risk through being informed.   
The language used in current crisis communication strategy approaches the public 
as helpless children who must be sheltered from unpleasant realities. Unfortunately, this 
approach has become part of the language that leaders use in crisis communication 
 66
efforts, with themes like “don’t overreact” and “remain calm,” while at the same time 
purposely leaving out information determined to be too frightening for the public such as 
in the preparation for dirty bombs. This was also the situation during the 2011 Japanese 
tsunami and resulting Fukushima nuclear disaster in which U.S. leadership told state 
officials to inform residents not to worry because radiation would not make it to the U.S. 
coast, when days later it showed up in radiation testing in the U.S. raising questions about 
leadership efforts to hide information:  
…the Obama administration’s initial reluctance to release its own 
radiation information and the haphazard way that the readings came 
dribbling out of Europe first—not the United States—raised questions 
about whether American officials were being as forthcoming as they had 
pressed the Japanese to be. (Broad, 2011)   
While the public may not need to know every technical detail in a crisis response, 
this parental approach affects the language that leaders use, reduces public trust, and, 
most importantly, prevents the public from being a part of the solution and a partner in 
the preparedness efforts.  
Subtle attempts have been made by some U.S. homeland security officials to 
increase public engagement. “What I’ve always found,” says James Lee Witt, FEMA 
director from 1993 to 2000, “is that people will respond to meet a need in a crisis if they 
know what to do. You give people the opportunity to be part of something that will make 
a difference, and they will step up” (Ripley, 2008, p. 211). Unfortunately, many attempts 
by government agencies to incorporate the public as a partner in disaster preparedness 
fail at truly engaging the public. For example, the announcement of the Homeland 
Security Advisory System (color-coded alert system) by Homeland Security director Tom 
Ridge was provided as a way to empower the public as a partner in homeland security. 
Unfortunately, it did not give the public any specific actions to take. 
In fact, the announcement included no suggestions on what citizens should 
do to reduce their risks at any particular stage of alert. Had the planners of 
the advisory system included just a few general safety tips for each threat 
level, the chart might have given Americans a sense that they could do 
something to reduce their risk—a sense of control. (Gray & Ropeik, 2002, 
p. 113) 
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A parental approach to homeland security messages damages U.S. preparedness 
efforts by encouraging the public to continually look to the government for personal help, 
protection, and assurance, rather than encouraging reliance on self and community. A 
public partnership with government, where people are prepared to take care of 
themselves if government resources are not immediately available, will strengthen the 
national’s overall preparedness.  
In summary, a comprehensive crisis communication strategy must incorporate 
language encouraging a public partnership in preparedness, response and recovery. This 
strategy must include specific actions to take and the acknowledgements of real dangers 
facing the public.  
4. Public Engagement Before a Disaster 
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recommends before a disaster, 
“information and training on implementing effective disaster behaviors [emphasis added] 
should be provided to the public…This information will further increase the confidence 
of the population by enhancing individual perceptions of self-efficacy and mastery,” 
according to the National Academy of Sciences (National Academy of Sciences [NAS], 
2003, p 107). The NAS also recommends going far beyond just providing the public with 
actions to take, and encourages clarifying controversial information and explaining why 
recommendations are or are not made. It also recommends admitting that conflicting 
answers may appear while solutions are being sought, and explaining what psychological 
reactions the public should expect of themselves (NAS, 2003, p. 109). 
The above recommendations represent a truthful approach to the public as a 
partner, helping set expectations, and when followed, gives people clear information on 
what is expected, what reactions they may expect to have to the crisis, and why 
government officials are doing and saying specific things.   
For an example of what this approach looks like when applied, we can turn to 
Winston Churchill, who survived near defeat as Britain’s leader during World War II.  
Churchill took the time to find the right messages to motivate the public even when the  
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days ahead were filled with difficulty. Below is a quote from one of Churchill’s speeches 
before Parliament in January 1942, informing the public of what had happened and what 
was about to happen: 
Things have gone badly and worse is to come. In no way have I mitigated 
the sense of danger and impending misfortunes of a minor character and of 
a severe character which still hang over us. But at the same time, I avow 
my confidence, never stronger than at this moment, that we shall bring this 
conflict to an end in a manner agreeable to the interests of our country, 
and in a manner agreeable to the future of the world. (Sandys & Littman, 
2007, p. 146) 
Churchill was also specific in his use of language to help individuals understand 
their role. According to authors Celia Sandys and Jonathan Littman, “Churchill 
challenged a nation to find strength and vision to look upon its current struggles as an 
opportunity for greatness in each and every man and woman” (2007, p. 144).  
Crisis communication strategy should incorporate the public as a partner rather 
than a victim or child who may not be able to handle the truth. 
5. Proposed Messages and Themes Before a Disaster 
The NAS research, as applied by Churchill’s approach of honestly setting 
expectations and engaging the public, points to the need for new messages from 
homeland security leaders in the before phase of a disaster. The Greensburg case study 
further reveals the importance of formally incorporating message themes into a 
comprehensive crisis community strategy before a crisis. These messages will also help 
counter the “it won’t happen to me” mindset of optimism bias and help to engage the 
public fully as part of the solution. The following message themes should be incorporated 
into the before phase of crisis communication plans:  
1. Disaster will happen to you,  
2. It will be life changing, and  




When combined with other strategies outlined here (i.e., offering messages of 
regret delivered by those previously affected by disaster, and offering specific actions for 
people to take), these messages would likely inspire the public to take steps to prepare for 
disaster.  
6. Potential Risk of the “Before” Disaster Message Approach 
These themes may not be popular to deliver, especially when disaster seems to 
evade a community or state for some time. This situation increases the risk the public 
may grow weary of hearing leaders say how disaster will happen to them and their 
community when it has not yet.  This requires the messages to be framed with supporting 
statistics showing how often the state, region, or county has had a devastating event that 
wreaked havoc on people and their property. The public should be reminded that over the 
course of a lifetime virtually everyone will be impacted by devastating circumstances, 
whether damaging storms and tornados, earthquake, hurricanes, fires, or the effects of 
terrorism activity. Although the message could be modified to say, “disaster can happen 
to you,” the research cited earlier in this chapter indicates that individuals will likely 
discount that message as they recall how they have avoided disaster so far, and they 
believe they can continue on the same path of unpreparedness based on historical 
experience.  The “disaster will happen to you” is more attention getting and when 
followed with statistics and personal stories, it has the power to move people from 
passive complacency to active preparedness.  
The goal of this direct messaging approach is not to frighten the public, nor to 
make them complacent when disaster does not happen. Rather, it is to present a strong 
case for being realistic about what real dangers each of us face every day, and move 
people to act in areas they can control to minimize the impact of disaster on their life.  
This approach is best supported by survivor psychology and survivor personality 
concepts, which encourage people to learn how to survive a disaster before it happens by 
changing the way they view the world. By simply being more aware of the dangers that 
happen in life and preparing for it to the best of one’s ability, odds of survival increase. 
Ben Sherwood, author of The Survivor Club (2009), has interviewed many survivors to 
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determine how we can reframe our thinking and attain a survivor personality.  In his 
research, he recalls being surprised to learn how many people are killed by cement trucks 
every year and being asked if was “disturbing to spend so much time thinking about the 
cement truck around the corner or if it was depressing to meet so many people slammed 
by life” but he said, no (Sherwood). He explains: 
Rather, it made me more realistic. To borrow from the military, I’ve got 
more situational awareness now. I’m more attuned to the possibility that 
things go wrong. I’m more alert to my blind spots and gorillas in our 
midst. And I’m a little more prepared. That’s not to say I would fare well 
if you dropped me in the woods with only one matchstick and a fishing 
hook. It just means that my outlook has changed. I’m more vigilant, but 
not to the point of distraction. To the extent that I exert any control, I 
know I can improve my chances. (Sherwood, 2009, p. 336) 
7. Implementing New “Before” Disaster Messages 
To ensure these recommended message themes are reinforced, as occurred prior 
to Greensburg, homeland security leaders must work with communities to conduct drills 
and exercises for a variety of disasters. These must occur not just in schools, but also in 
businesses and organizations and other community gatherings. And finally, leaders must 
work with numerous sectors in the crisis communication system to get their preparedness 
messages out for a wider variety of potential disasters specific to their community, so as 
to increase citizen awareness and preparedness and add credibility to their message. 
Greensburg reveals the success of a before messaging effort at the state and local 
level for a community impacted by a familiar disaster, despite the fact there was not a 
before phase strategy formally written into crisis communication plans. Expanding this 
concept and written strategy to other disasters, especially those considered high risk for 
Kansas, as part of a state and local comprehensive crisis communication plan, which 
incorporates pragmatic complexity model and the above messaging themes would 
improve the outcome of other communities impacted by various disasters in Kansas. 
Homeland security leaders must incorporate message themes into crisis 
communication strategy well before the next crisis to ensure the public is engaged in 
preparedness efforts and has a readiness state of mind. This critical step will assist in 
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moving people from the mindset where they are passively educated about how disaster 
can happen to them, to the mindset where they believe there is a very high likelihood 
disaster will happen to them at some point in their lifetime, leading them to take action to 
minimize the effects of disaster. 
C. GREENSBURG “DURING” PHASE 
The success of crisis communication efforts in the event phase or “during” phase 
in Greensburg can be attributed to several factors. These included local leaders using 
crisis communication guidance (primarily federal), which urged leaders to communicate 
in an open, honest and frequent manner while also providing something for the public to 
do (CDC, 2002b, p. 21). It also included the use of survivor psychology concepts by local 
and state leaders in Greensburg as they framed the disaster as a new opportunity for 
Greensburg.  
1. Changing Strategy in the During Phase 
While this phase of the crisis communication effort is the most established of all 
phases in crisis planning nationwide, the Greensburg case study reveals some areas for 
improvements. First, leadership must anticipate the complexity of the crisis 
communication cycle and understand that it involves more than just media. By looking at 
the day-to-day changes of the communication efforts in Greensburg during the first week, 
it is clear the media, government, political officials, and the public were each impacting 
one another and causing a shift in the focus of the messages depending on the input into 
the system. Current strategy produces highly reactive responses to each of these inputs. A 
shift to a complex model of crisis communication is needed to anticipate communication 
needs. The Greensburg case study reveals the “during” phase of crisis communication 
strategy would specifically benefit from the pragmatic complexity model, developed at 
Arizona State University and referenced in earlier chapters of this document.  
The pragmatic complexity model recommends leaders embrace complexity and 
deemphasize the illusion of control because “communication takes place in a complex 
system of double contingency that can be partially influenced, but not controlled by the  
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participants” (Corman et al., 2007, p. 12).  Viewing a complex world using a simple 
paradigm will leave people confused and constantly behind the development of real-
world events.  
The pragmatic complexity model also recommends relying on “variations on a 
message theme,” that is, by being ready to change your message to fit the dynamic 
situation at hand. In addition, pragmatic complexity suggests “considering disruptions,” 
that is those game-changing events where your messages may no longer work. That leads 
into the final recommendation of having a contingency plan when efforts fail (Corman et 
al., 2007, pp. 13–14).  
2. When Pre-Scripted Message Themes and Linear Thinking Do Not 
Work 
As the case study indicated, the first few days of the state’s response to 
Greensburg offered a number of challenges outside the scope of communication themes 
for the during phase of an event. These themes, used by state and local leaders included 
discussing the following: 
1. What happened (loss of life, tornado damage), 
2. What government was doing about it (the state/local response), and 
3. What the public should do (what Greensburg residents and Kansans could 
do to help). 
The moments and hours after the disaster held the common events of many other 
disasters, including receiving too many donations from the public, needing to shelter 
numerous displaced pets, and finding the best way to remove tons of debris, which 
included dangerous chemicals and weapons strewn about the town. While these issues 
seemed to intensify the chaos already present in a destroyed community, they were small 
compared to the ongoing challenges brought by the truly unexpected aspects of the 
disaster.  
One of the most significant of the challenges were the governor’s comments about 
National Guard equipment deployed to Iraq resulting in a slow Kansas National Guard 
response. Another was the looting by active duty military members and later the mayor 
resigning due to the mounting stress of rebuilding his own home and his entire town. An 
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additional challenge was the growing environmental and health concerns over the 
response and recovery. Each of these problems added more communication issues to an 
already chaotic scene and reinforced the importance of homeland security leaders 
embracing, or at least understanding, the chaotic nature of these kinds of events. 
Applying the pragmatic complexity model to Greensburg during the crisis would 
have helped leaders as they encountered these challenges, providing them an alternative 
to the crisis communication plans that do not always fit the situation.  Recognizing that 
the need for adaptability in a crisis communication strategy is essential in this type of 
dynamic, chaotic environment as one unexpected event followed another. While Bunting 
and Hewitt followed crisis communication principles taught by risk communication 
researchers, such as Vincent Covello, the pragmatic complexity model recognizes the 
need to embrace the unexpected, such as the governor’s comment about Guard equipment 
rising to the level of President Bush’s spokesman, who countered her comments in a 
news conference at the White House.  
The pragmatic complexity model also acknowledges the need to vary the 
message, consider disruptions for the positives or negatives they could bring to the 
intended messages, and have a contingency plan for when plans do not work (Corman et 
al., 2007, pp. 12–14). Instead, the leaders in Greensburg were focused on the tasks at 
hand and were completely surprised by the turn of events brought about by the 
governor’s comments about National Guard equipment at a news conference. Using this 
model could have helped them embrace the chaos and disruptions, modify the message 
quickly, and not rely on prior pre-written communication plans that were not designed to 
work in a non-linear setting, where unexpected events after the dynamics of leadership 
messages.  
As the pragmatic complexity model addresses, with each new unexpected event, 
leaders in Greensburg were forced to vary their messages to address the changing events; 
however, not expecting these turn of events, they were left with linear model crisis 
communication guidance. Unfortunately, the disruptions offered few opportunities for 
more effective messages because as often occurs in a crisis, leaders fell into the mode of 
simply reacting and responding to the next media report thrown at them.  
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Although there was not a contingency plan for failure, this planning concept 
would have been beneficial to consider prior to the event and events like Greensburg.  
This concept is contrary to the “failure is not an option” often expressed by military and 
homeland security leaders. Admitting the very real potential of tactical failure and 
embracing it will not be popular for many in the homeland security sector; however, just 
like embracing chaos, it does allow for a new way of thinking about disasters and, 
therefore, new ways of approaching crisis communication strategy in a disaster. Having a 
contingency plan would have allowed leaders to anticipate the unexpected, quickly adapt, 
and refocus their messages, rather than simply react. 
In summary, homeland security leaders must consider the pragmatic complexity 
model in the event/during phase of a crisis to truly be prepared for the chaotic nature of 
disasters. This includes embracing chaos, varying messages, considering disruptions and 
planning for failure incorporated into a comprehensive crisis communication strategy.  
D. GREENSBURG “AFTER” PHASE  
1. Resilient Messages and Survivor Psychology in the “After” Phase 
In Greensburg, the use of resilient messaging after the tornado proved successful 
in encouraging residents to not only remain in their town and rebuild their lives, but also 
to take an active role in rebuilding Greensburg better than it was before. Resilient 
messages are messages that acknowledge the challenges but focus on the future 
possibilities. Today, there is a population of nearly 900 of the approximately 1,500 
original residents. This number represents considerably more residents than many leaders 
anticipated would return to Greensburg. The town’s residents held numerous community 
meetings and boldly decided to rebuild in an environmentally friendly manner (Planet 
Green Discovery Channel, 2009).  
The actions and language used by leaders in the hours and days after the tornado 
helped many residents to envision a future in Greensburg, to reconsider moving to a 
nearby town, and rebuild in Greensburg instead. This happened, in part, due to the 
leadership efforts and communication efforts of Bunting and Hewitt, who while having 
never worked together prior to the disaster, were able to consistently communicate a 
 75
bright vision for the future, along with messages inspiring a resilient comeback for the 
town. The leaderships’ use of resilient messages in their communication style serves as 
an excellent example of what works well and what should be formally adopted into 
comprehensive state and local crisis communication strategy during all phases of a 
disaster but especially in the days, weeks, and months following a disaster.  
Bunting and Hewitt provided an honest appraisal of what was ahead for the 
community, acknowledging challenges, and helping residents to visualize a new 
community. Their messages used language offering hope, but they also realistically 
outlining the challenging work ahead.  
“Although you drive through and see the devastation, if you’ll dream a little bit, 
you can see a lot of opportunity,” Hewitt said.  “I don’t say a tornado is something you 
want to happen, but we just finally got that one opportunity now for a turnaround” (Planet 
Green, Discovery Channel, 2009). 
Bunting’s focus on resilient messaging came from research he was conducting to 
build a resiliency program for National Guard members because of the growing number 
of suicides the Kansas National Guard had experienced in the Global War on Terrorism 
(Hansen, 2009). His research lead him to the concepts of survivor psychology, which 
meant looking at Greensburg based on what was really happening and a willingness to 
consider solutions sometimes often or previously ruled out (Green, 2011, p. 4). It also 
meant being confident and being persistent in finding a solution (Green, 2011, p. 4). 
Hewitt and Bunting’s actions and messages were in sync and helped them to inspire those 
in the community, encouraging those who did not think that they could survive such a 
disaster and rebound from it. These resiliency and survivor psychology concepts not only 
framed their language about the disaster, but also framed their individual leadership 
actions to decisions necessary in the response and recovery phase.  
Homeland security leaders should adopt concepts of resiliency and survivor 
psychology for before, during, and after phases of a disaster, and incorporate these into 
state and local crisis communication plans to shape the future of a community positively. 
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2. Overcoming Hopelessness After Disaster 
The importance of homeland security leaders using resilient messaging and 
survivor psychology concepts following a disaster is evident through research from the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. It indicates individuals have a difficult time seeing 
themselves recover from something devastating:  
…people tend to be too pessimistic about their ability to mentally 
recover—they presume that the immediate negative reactions they would 
have to negative events would persist in the future. In all these cases the 
excessive pessimism that immediately follows a negative event is the 
mirror image of the optimistic bias that arises before it: we simply find it 
difficult to imagine a negative set of circumstances (such as city under 
water) being made right again. (Meyer, 2006, p. 163) 
This research reveals the need for homeland security leaders to communicate a 
vision of hope after a disaster. This occurred in Greensburg as local and state leaders 
spent the next two months laying out the vision of a new Greensburg and encouraging the 
public to be a partner in the recovery process. By using resilient messages and survivor 
psychology concepts, Bunting and Hewitt’s communication was critical in preventing 
many residents from giving up and simply thinking the disaster was too much to 
overcome. Although some residents and businesses did leave the community to relocate 
elsewhere, the majority stayed in Greensburg accepting their leaderships’ vision for a 
town rebuilt better than the one they had known before (Planet Green, Discovery 
Channel, 2009).  
3. Changing Strategy in the “After” Phase 
Current crisis communication strategy does not address leadership communication 
and actions much beyond the date of the disaster. Although leaders used resilient 
messaging to get Greensburg back on track, this was not a part of state and local crisis 
communication plans. Luckily, it occurred because of the particular leaders in the 
Greensburg response. 
In addition, lack of comprehensive communication plans after the disaster 
resulted in some lost opportunities in the weeks following the Greensburg disaster. These 
included:  
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 No strategic effort to tell the public what went right as well as what went 
wrong for the government and/or for individuals in the disaster,  
 No strategy to tell the public the lessons learned that will or should be 
applied to future disaster response and individual preparedness, and  
 No plan to highlight how public preparedness helped save lives in 
Greensburg, or how it could have helped in more ways had additional 
preparedness measures been in place.  
Strategic efforts to tell the successes and failures of the preparedness, response 
and recovery could have served as a powerful communication tool to improve individual 
and community preparedness levels throughout the state.  These stories could have been 
told through news stories, public service announcements, public television segments, or 
Web (and social media outreach efforts which the public was just beginning to use), as 
well as presentations for school and community faith-based groups and events.  
Research supports these communication steps. Having individuals who were 
impacted by a disaster discuss their regrets about not being more prepared or regretting 
not taking different action is persuasive and would impress upon individuals the 
importance of preparing before it is too late (Meyer, 2006, p. 172). Additional research 
shows negative messages indicating the presence of risk is evaluated as more trustworthy 
than positive messages communicating the absence of risk (Breckinridge & Zimbardo, 
2007a, p. 122). In other words, if individuals communicate how difficult things were and 
how their actions could have changed the situation, that message is more effective than 
simply telling people to be prepared. Having individuals and government leaders 
repeatedly address what should have been done differently would also add to the 
credibility of homeland security leaders’ warnings regarding future disasters.  
4. Public Engagement After a Disaster 
After the crisis, the NAS recommends U.S. homeland security and emergency 
management officials take a number of steps currently missing from our nation’s crisis 
communication strategy: 
In the post-event phase, officials should communicate how preparedness 
helped to decrease the psychological impact of the attack and continue to  
publicize available services to the public in general, and provide targeted 
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messages to specialized segments of the population who may be at greater 
risk for adverse consequences. (NAS, 2003, p. 131) 
NAS also recommends conveying psychological consequences the public should 
look for after an event (NAS, 2003, p. 131). 
The post-disaster phase of a crisis is a phase where current crisis communication 
strategy misses many opportunities because our strategy focuses largely on after action 
reports to determine if we provided the right messages. This internal process does not 
help the public understand what went right or wrong. Unfortunately, that debate gets left 
up to the 24-hour media cycle of talk shows and paid experts to analyze government 
efforts in homeland security.  
5. Proposed Messages and Themes After a Disaster 
Current crisis communication strategy would benefit greatly from applying these 
post-disaster phase recommendations, based on NAS research. In addition, the 
Greensburg case study also reveals the importance of incorporating message themes for 
the after phase of a crisis into a comprehensive crisis community strategy. To counter the 
hopelessness mindset which research indicates happens after a disaster, homeland 
security leaders have a critical role in the weeks and months after a disaster. The 
following message themes should be incorporated into the after phase of crisis 
communication plans.  
Tell the public: 
 What went right/wrong (for government and individuals) 
 What will be done differently for the next disaster  
 What public preparedness measures helped/would have helped minimize 
the impact of the disaster 
Providing the above recommendations to the public, when combined with other 
strategies outlined here, will allow the public to better engage as a partner in the crisis 
process by knowing how to engage before a disaster, what to do during, why it resulted as 
it did, and what it all means for the next disaster.  
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6. Potential Risk of the “After” Disaster Message Approach 
Some leaders may not be comfortable focusing on what government did wrong 
after a disaster; therefore, the alternative is to focus on overall places where some 
improvements or enhancements can be made to the process without pinpointing 
individual or department failures. Another option is to focus on the community and 
individual preparedness and areas where improvements and enhancements can be made 
for an even safer and more resilient community in the future. 
7. Take Advantage of the Post Tragedy Opportunity Bubble 
After a disaster, leaders can take additional steps to take advantage of the “post 
tragedy opportunity bubble,” a term coined by Fahali Moghaddam and James 
Breckenridge (2011). Based on their research, Moghaddam and Breckenridge argue there 
is a window of opportunity after an event like 9/11 where the public wants to do more 
and be a partner in the recovery, such as volunteering (Breckenridge & Moghaddam,  
p. 2). They state “Leadership must pay special attention to opportunities to engage the 
public as capable partners in their country’s response to the crisis—calling upon them as 
citizens with civic duties, as well as rights” (Breckenridge & Moghaddam, 2011, p. 1). 
Moghaddam and Breckenridge found that two thirds of survey respondents did 
not believe the government had given them an adequate way to participate in defending 
the country after 9/11 (Breckenridge & Moghaddam, 2011, p. 2). 
Homeland security leaders should incorporate the publics’ stories and 
governments’ lessons learned into messages to show what went right, what went wrong, 
and what changes will be made to future disaster response, as well as to show the 
powerful role of public preparedness in the outcome of the disaster. 
E. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A NEW STRATEGY FOR CRISIS 
COMMUNICATION AT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
The development of a new crisis communication strategy for homeland security 
incorporating the concepts outlined in this chapter would benefit homeland security 
leaders at the federal, state, and local levels of government, but the top priority should be 
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placed on a state-level strategy. Local governments are limited in resources and staffing 
to develop a comprehensive strategy and the federal government is challenged to produce 
a strategy that fits all 50 states. Therefore, a state-level strategy holds the most promise 
for robust implementation and for subsequent adaptability by local government.  
Recent research by the Multi-National Community Resilience Policy Sub Group, 
co-chaired by David Kaufman of FEMA, revealed the benefits of implementation of new 
strategy at the state/local level (Bach, Doran, Gibb, Kaufman, & Settle, 2010). The group 
looked at a number of communities in the U.S. and around the world affected by disasters 
to determine what best practices could be applied to future strategy for community 
resilience. They found a number of positive efforts underway at the community level 
after a disaster, giving validity to the idea that federal-level or top-down strategy may not 
be the best approach (Bach et al., 2010).  
…the emphasis on local collective action, non-governmental groups, 
neighborhood institutions, and public participation is a significant strategic 
shift…the shift is evolving because of the changing context of natural and 
man-made risks and the realization that community resilience is essential 
to national and local survival. The fundamental belief is that the lead role 
must be played by society—individuals, groups, organizations and 
communities—who can understand and respond better to the complex 
risks. (Bach et al., 2010, p. 28)  
In addition, the public is likely to relate more closely to those leaders in their 
community and state whom they have met or seen frequently in public settings or on 
local media. Psychologists James Breckenridge and Philip Zimbardo address this local 
versus federal approach in their research on how best to manage public fears related to 
terrorism (2007, p. 128). “Neither federal government public affairs efforts nor national 
media communications are likely to adequately address public concerns at state and local 
levels,” they state (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 128). Breckenridge and Zimbardo 
go on to recommend “development and field testing of risk communications tailored 
specifically to local concerns, priorities, and cultural norms and attitudes” (2007, p. 128).  
Research referenced earlier in this document also supports Breckenridge and 
Zimbardo’s recommendation, revealing that disaster communication is most effective 
when it includes specific messages, such as what to do for a tornado or hurricane, rather 
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than general preparedness messages. This type of strategy is best developed at the state 
level because of the vast differences from state to state. 
Homeland security leaders at the state level are more likely to know the concerns 
of the residents in their state as well as the specific threats in their state, which makes 
state officials the most qualified to develop a comprehensive crisis communication 
strategy. A state plan would be more adaptable to local governments in the same state 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Crisis communication plans and guidance at all levels of government have 
traditionally focused almost exclusively on communicating during a crisis, rather than a 
comprehensive approach incorporating the timeframe well before and well after a crisis. 
A case study of the 2007 Greensburg, Kansas tornado assessed the crisis communication 
strategy surrounding the disaster to assist in the development of a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy for homeland security. The case study revealed a number of 
positive actions taken by the public and government as well as areas where improvements 
should be made in future crisis communication strategy.     
Furthermore, the case study findings reinforced the need for homeland security 
leaders to reframe crisis communication, to incorporate strategy for the phases well 
before and well after a disaster, and to incorporate a number of new approaches into crisis 
communication strategy. 
B. REFRAME HOW CRISIS COMMUNICATION IS VIEWED 
Crisis communication strategy must be reframed using a crisis communication 
cycle (before, during, and after) that never ends, but constantly moves from one phase to 
the next. By viewing disasters as part of a normal and ongoing cycle in the world and in 
our lives, homeland security leaders and individuals can better use the time between 
disasters to prepare for what is inevitably coming in the next disaster, and to learn from 
what happened in the last disaster. Author Ted Lewis explains this as “Life is a series of 
passages from catastrophe to catastrophe with inconsequential periods of calm in 
between. We need to learn to navigate stormy seas, because they are the new normal” 
(Lewis, 2010, p. 10). 
1. What the Greensburg Case Study Revealed about Reframing  
The Greensburg tornado case study revealed the success of communicating 
before, during, and after a disaster, but many of the successes were due to random luck of 
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the situation, and not part of a comprehensive crisis communication strategy at the state 
or local level. The successes included multiple messages on tornado preparedness 
regularly disseminated by many entities, tornados being a familiar and believable threat 
in Kansas, and state and local leaders driven to use resilient messaging and survivor 
psychology concepts to rally the community back from devastation. The success of the 
preparedness measures surrounding Greensburg shows what is needed in a new 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy for Kansas. This crisis communication 
strategy for homeland security leaders could also be adapted for use by other states and 
by local governments.  
2. Recommendation: Before and After Message Themes 
The current communication guidance and information cycle focuses almost 
entirely on the time immediately before a crisis, during, and immediately after a crisis, 
but misses opportunities to reach and engage the public in the longest timeframe 
available: long before a disaster and long after the last disaster. Homeland security 
leaders generally use the following message themes to guide their communication 
through a disaster:  
1. Tell the public what happened,  
2. Tell the public what government is doing, and  
3. Give the public something to do to stay safe or engaged. (FEMA, 2009) 
While this a valid approach, it needs to be greatly expanded to the before and after 
phases of a disaster, also including well-planned message themes and strategic actions in 
these phases. Based on research regarding how individuals think before and after a 
disaster, the themes that follow will help homeland security leaders guide the community 
through these additional phases.   
The before phase should include the following message themes to improve 
public engagement and enhance resiliency:  
1. Disaster will happen to you,  
2. It will be life changing, and  
3. You have the power and responsibility to minimize the impact.   
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These messaging themes, when paired with additional strategies such as messages 
of regret from people affected by previous disasters, historical statistics of disasters in a 
specific state or region, and specific disaster preparedness instructions, will help shift the 
public away from “a disaster won’t happen to me” mindset and encourage them to 
visualize the real possibility of a disaster happening to them and prepare for it. 
The after phase should include the following themes:  
1. What went right/wrong (for government and individuals), 
2. What will be done differently for the next disaster, and  
3. What public preparedness measures helped/would have helped minimize 
the impact of the disaster. 
These messaging themes, when delivered after a disaster will take advantage of 
the “post tragedy opportunity bubble,” that is, they will have a greater effect on 
individuals because of the timing of the message to a disaster (Breckenridge & 
Moghaddam, 2011, p. 2). 
C. UTILIZE COMPLEX SYSTEMS APPROACH   
Crisis communication can no longer be viewed using a simple linear model in 
which government provides a message and the media and public responds to the message. 
The entire complex system must be considered when developing strategy, especially 
given the dynamics social media bring to the communication environment. This means a 
communication strategy must anticipate the potential political issues in disaster, the 
emotional reactions of the public, the private sector business sustainment issues, tension 
with other government entities, and how media and social media impacts and constantly 
alters the public’s perception of the disaster. The complex system of communication must 
be anticipatory because any unexpected actions can alter and may derail the focus of 
messages of each phase (before/during/after). 
The pragmatic complexity model, when applied to crisis communication strategy, 
offers a new approach for homeland security leaders that recognizes the dynamic aspects 
of disasters and offers an alternative to communication plans built on linear models 
(Corman et al., 2007, pp. 12–14). 
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1. What the Greensburg Case Study Revealed about Complex Systems 
The Greensburg tornado case study analyzed the anticipated and unanticipated 
dynamics surrounding the tornado strike through the lens of a complexity model 
approach and specifically a pragmatic complex model, rather than linear model approach 
to crisis communication. The dynamics included politically charged differences of 
opinion between the governor and White House officials regarding National Guard 
equipment availability for domestic response use, the arrests of active duty military 
members for looting, the unexpected resignation of a mayor, and health and 
environmental concerns associated with the disaster site. The analysis revealed homeland 
security leaders were using a linear approach to communication. While this disaster 
occurred prior to the widespread use of social media by public and media, the 
communication flow occurred in a complex system. Greensburg leaders would have 
benefited greatly from a pragmatic complex model for crisis communication (Corman et 
al., 2007, pp. 12–14).  
2. Recommendation: Utilize Pragmatic Complexity Model for All 
Disaster Phases 
Using a pragmatic complexity model in the before, during, and after phases of a 
disaster will help homeland security leaders prepare for unexpected events that happen in 
real situations and take into consideration the complex dynamics involving unexpected 
public reactions. It will also help leaders with governmental missteps and tension, 
political posturing, and the effects created by the news and social media.  By following 
the aspects of the pragmatic complexity model, homeland security leaders are more likely 
to succeed in their crisis communication efforts than by relying on the traditional linear 
model of crisis communication (e.g., a model where leaders simply try to get the right 
messages to the media at the right time) (Corman et al., 2007, pp. 12–14). 
D. SHIFT TO PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP APPROACH 
Crisis communication strategy must incorporate the concept of fully engaging the 
public as a capable partner and move away from the current condescending parental 
approach that is communicating to the public as children who need protection from bad 
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news and difficult decisions. Efforts have been made at public partnership in 
preparedness on the federal level with FEMA’s Be Ready campaign, and DHS’s If You 
See Something, Say Something campaign. However, the language that public officials 
use when disseminating negative information and the approach public officials take when 
determining when to release information still treats the public as incapable of dealing 
with reality. Homeland security leaders must change the language they use with the 
public to show that they recognize the public is a real partner in preparedness, response, 
and recovery. This change from a parental approach to a public partnership approach will 
also affect decisions about when to release information and what to release. 
1. What the Greensburg Case Study Revealed about Public Partnership 
Approach 
The Greensburg case study revealed the benefits of having residents personally 
engaged in their own preparedness efforts prior to a disaster, which likely increased 
survival rates during the tornado. However, had Greensburg experienced a different type 
of disaster where preparedness measures are not well known and individuals are not 
familiar with the threat or appropriate preparedness efforts, the results would not have 
been as positive.  
The Greensburg tornado case study also revealed a need for more public 
partnership efforts well after the event.  Homeland security leaders did not talk to the 
public after the tornado regarding what went right, what went wrong, and what will be 
changed to improve future communication and preparedness efforts.  This type of honest 
transparency would increase public participation in preparedness efforts and also take 
advantage of the public’s focus immediately after the disaster when the effects are still 
very recent and real. Unfortunately, because government officials are often worried about 
detailed scrutiny of their previous preparedness and response efforts, this step is 
frequently avoided.  If these types of concerns prevent this step from occurring, an 
alternative is to focus on the public actions related to what went right and wrong and 
what enhanced public preparedness measures could be taken in the future. This 
communication strategy would help the community understand what preparations need to 
be made by individuals, and as communities before the next disaster.  
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2. Recommendation: Shift from Parental Approach to Public 
Partnership Approach 
Homeland security leaders must strongly encourage public engagement and 
individual responsibility for disaster preparedness. This will require homeland security 
leaders to avoid using parental thinking and parental language and instead acknowledge 
the public as a partner. It will also require homeland security leaders to consider sharing 
difficult news sooner. This will demonstrate that government officials view the public as 
a true partner in the preparedness, response, and recovery process. Certain national 
security information will always remain out of the public domain, but much more could 
and should be provided to engage the public. This approach must be incorporated in 
messaging well before and well after a disaster, not just during the crisis. 
E. UTILIZE RESILIENT MESSAGING/SURVIVOR PSYCHOLOGY  
Resilient messages must be included during all phases of a disaster. While state 
and local homeland security leaders in Greensburg only used these concepts in the “after” 
phase of the tornado disaster, using language encouraging resiliency and a survivor 
mindset in the “before” and “during” phase would help communicate realistic public 
expectations of government agencies and prepare the public for the individual and 
community challenges ahead. A great example of this type of language can be found in 
the speeches of Winston Churchill from the darkest days of World War II. In 1941, he 
spoke to the school he had attended saying:  
Do not let us speak of darker days, let us rather speak of sterner days, the 
greatest days our country has ever lived; and we must all thank God that 
we have been allowed, each according to our stations, to play a part in 
making these days memorable in the history of our race. (Sandys & 
Littman, 2003, p. 144)  
The unique aspect of this communication style is Churchill’s willingness to be 
amazingly blunt and truthful about the difficulties ahead, while also offering hope of 
eventual success.  
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1. What the Greensburg Case Study Revealed about Resiliency/Survivor 
Psychology Approach 
The Greensburg tornado case study revealed the benefits of incorporating 
resiliency/survivor psychology into the language of homeland security leaders after the 
disaster in May 2007.  The adjutant general and director of emergency management for 
Kansas, Maj. Gen. Tod Bunting, along with Greensburg City Administrator Steve Hewitt, 
and federal officials did not shy away from talking about the difficulties ahead in the 
weeks, months, and years to come.  
“Some of the rubble is just so deep,” Bunting said, after assessing the extent of 
the work ahead (Hegeman, 2007b).  
“It’s going to take a long time for the community to recover,” President Bush said 
the weekend after the tornado hit (Hegeman, 2007b). 
But officials also used resilient messages to help the public envision a better 
future in the town of Greensburg and to help them remain resilient.   
“I see a community coming together. I see a future here. I really do,” Hewitt told 
media (Hegeman, 2007b). 
“The town will be back, I have no doubt about that,” said Dick Hainje, regional 
administrator for FEMA (Hegeman, 2007b). 
2. Recommendation: Shift Approach to Move Public from Helpless 
Victim Mindset to Resilient Survivor Mindset 
Individuals have a very difficult time imagining their recovery from a significant 
personal setback, according to the research addressed in earlier chapters, but homeland 
security leaders can influence this paralyzing thinking with a properly focused crisis 
communication strategy.  This strategy must include language explaining the challenges 
ahead to provide the public a realistic idea of what they face. The strategy must also 
include language that offers hope for a future.  And finally, the strategy must reveal how 
the public’s involvement is needed for success. Homeland security leaders must consider 
the power of their words before, during, and after a disaster and incorporate messages of 
resilience and a survivor mindset into crisis communication strategy.  
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F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
The case study of the deadly 2007 Greensburg tornado, along with a literature 
review, set out to answer a primary question and a subset of questions to determine what 
should be included in a comprehensive crisis community strategy for homeland security.  
1. What Can We Learn from the Communication Practices Surrounding 
the Deadly Greensburg, Kansas Tornado in May 2007 to Assist in Developing a 
Comprehensive Crisis Communication Strategy for Before, During, and After a 
Crisis which Incorporates Resilient Messaging and Encourages Public Engagement?  
The Greensburg disaster revealed a number of efforts that were successful and 
should be adopted into a comprehensive crisis communication strategy for homeland 
security. These successes included tornado preparedness messages from multiple 
government and private entities well before the tornado, and a public engaged in tornado 
preparedness who heeded the weather warnings. The successes in Greensburg also 
included resilient messaging delivered by local and state leaders after the tornado.  
Overall, the case study revealed a critical need to develop a comprehensive 
strategy for the before and after phases of a disaster so as not to overlook these valuable 
phases when so much can be accomplished to get individuals and communities ready for 
the next disaster. The study revealed the need to reframe the way we think about disasters 
overall, not viewing them as rare but as the norm. This forces homeland security leaders 
and individuals to acknowledge that preparation must be an ongoing process and lessons 
continually learned and applied. The case study revealed the need to utilize a pragmatic 
complexity model for crisis communication to ensure leaders do not fall into the habit of 
linear communication plans in a dynamic environment where those plans no longer work.  
A subset of questions sought to determine how to develop the specific aspects of 
the comprehensive crisis communication strategy.   
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a. What is a Reasonable Approach for Homeland Security Leaders 
to Engage the Public in Crisis Communications Before, During, 
and After a Crisis to Enhance Community Resilience?  
The Greensburg tornado case study and research revealed a need for a 
shift in the current approach to crisis communication, where government officials view 
the public as children who should be shielded from difficult news, to a public partnership 
approach, which speaks to them as equal partners in the disaster preparedness, response, 
and recovery process.  
The case study and research also showed the need for leaders to 
incorporate specific “before” disaster message themes, such as “disaster will happen,” 
and “after” disaster message themes, such as addressing what went right or wrong, to 
encourage an ongoing preparedness public mindset. 
And finally, the case study and research showed the value of incorporating 
resilient messaging into crisis communication strategy. This is true not only after disaster, 
but for all phases of a disaster to help the public visualize the devastation disaster can 
bring, inspire hope they can get through disaster together, and envision a future after 
disaster.  
b. What Message Themes Should Homeland Security Leaders Use 
to Help the Public Better Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover 
from a Crisis?  
The research indicated specific “before” and “after” disaster message 
themes (listed earlier in this chapter) should be added to the current “during” message 
themes for a truly comprehensive crisis communication strategy. These themes would 
assist in getting in the public’s attention before and after a disaster and are necessary to 
have an engaged public ready to help with disaster preparedness and response. The 
research also indicated these “before” disaster themes will help move the public from a 
“disaster won’t happen to me” mindset to a “disaster will happen to me” mindset. The 
latter type of thinking is more likely to prompt them to prepare. The “after” disaster 
themes will assist in ensuring lessons learned are captured and applied by individuals, 
communities, and government. 
 92
c. Can Research into Individual Resiliency and Survivor 
Psychology Provide Insight into Crisis Communication 
Messaging that Will Help the General Public?  
Several psychologists and authors, referenced in the research, indicate the 
benefits of resilient thinking and a survivor mindset when preparing to face a potentially 
devastating situation, getting through it, and rebounding from it. These concepts originate 
from authors who have interviewed and studied those who have survived tragedy and 
assessed their mindset prior to, during, and after the devastation. Resiliency and survivor 
psychologists believe this is a mindset everyone can develop prior to a devastating event. 
Their research suggests incorporating resilient messaging in crisis communication 
strategy would benefit the public’s overall resilience. The Greensburg tornado case study 
further supports this because state and local leaders applied resilient messaging to their 
communication and action strategy following the tornado. This resulted in the majority of 
the residents stayed in the community, rebuilding their homes and working to make their 
community better than before. 
d. What do Communication Practices in Disasters Other Than the 
Greensburg Tornado Offer to the Development of a 
Comprehensive Crisis Communication Strategy for Homeland 
Security?  
The communication of leaders following 9/11 revealed the benefits of 
resilient messaging offered by Rudolf Giuliani, the mayor of New York City. Giuliani 
followed current communication guidance of telling the public what was happening, what 
government was doing, and what the public should do. He also practiced delivering the 
“during” disaster messages well in advance, which likely lead to more successful delivery 
of those messages.  However, review of 9/11 communication practices also revealed the 
lack of a comprehensive strategy for crisis communication for New York leaders to 
utilize—long before the disaster and long after the disaster to help engage the public and 
assist them in becoming more resilient individuals and developing a more resilient 
community.  
A review of the communication surrounding Hurricane Katrina revealed a 
crisis communication failure as leaders did not follow current guidance and let the 
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complexity of the event overtake and overwhelm their efforts. It also showed the 
importance of a comprehensive crisis communication plan to engage the public and 
incorporate resilient messaging. The lack of a “before” disaster messaging strategy to 
help the public visualize a disaster happening to them lead many people to resist 
evacuation because they had survived past disasters and did not believe a significant 
disaster could actually happen to them. The lack of an “after” disaster messaging strategy 
for homeland security leaders allowed the media to frame the “lessons learned” in 
unflattering terms, versus the local, state, and federal government leaders publically 
assessing what could have been better and what they plan to do differently next time. 
e. At What Level of Government (Local, State, or Federal) Should 
this Comprehensive Crisis Communication Strategy for 
Homeland Security Be Implemented?  
The case study and research pointed to the benefits of a state-level 
approach, which would be adaptable by local government. Although a federal approach 
could work for some situations, states are radically different, making a top down 
approach that is applicable and effective in all 50 states difficult to impossible to deliver. 
Research also shows communities are developing effective plans without the help of 
federal government, and the benefit of these plans is they address the unique needs of a 
specific state, region, or community. Additional research shows the effectiveness of 
messaging that is specific to disasters common to a specific area and delivered by local 
and state officials familiar to the audience. 
G. CONCLUSION  
This research and case study set out to prove a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy should be developed for homeland security leaders to use before, 
during, and after a crisis, which incorporates resilient messages and survivor psychology, 
to enhance individual and community resilience.  
The Greensburg tornado case study and research proved the current crisis 
communication efforts at federal, state and local levels are not comprehensive in that they 
focus almost exclusively on preparing for the “during” phase of a disaster. This overlooks 
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the time long before and long after a disaster that could be utilized to get leaders and the 
public in a preparedness mindset. It also overlooks ways to help individuals, 
communities, and government apply lessons from disasters after they happen.   
The thesis confirmed the need for homeland security leaders to reframe disasters, 
not as something rare and unusual, but as something that will happen and are part of the 
norm. Because of the complex dynamics surrounding disasters, the research and case 
study showed the importance of moving from a linear communication model to a 
pragmatic complexity communication model. This will help homeland security leaders 
anticipate these chaotic environments and have crisis communication contingency plans 
in place when things do not go as planned. 
The research into how individuals receive information and best respond to 
messages also confirmed the benefit of moving to a public engagement approach and 
resilient messaging approach. This can be done by incorporating both approaches into the 
comprehensive crisis communication strategy. The case study also showed a need for 
specific before and after message themes to assist in engaging the public and helping 
them become more resilient. 
Furthermore, the research concluded a state-level strategy would be most 
effective and allow for specific messaging to be delivered by leaders familiar to the 
residents, rather than attempting to apply a federal approach to 50 different states.  
H. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Additional research should be done with more communities struck by disasters 
like Greensburg where applied pre-disaster messages and post-disaster messages could be 
measured for effectiveness in minimizing the effects of a disaster. This would help to 
determine if there are additional concepts equally suited for inclusion in a comprehensive 
state-level crisis communication plan beyond those highlighted in this thesis. It would 
also be beneficial to study the various methods of delivery of messages in all phases of a 
disaster to determine if a more effective method exists or if the results vary with the 
disaster and the community where it occurs.   
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Additional research should be conducted on the benefits of resilient messaging 
and survivor psychology concepts. While psychological concepts have been applied to 
crisis communication in the past, resiliency, and survivor psychology are new concepts in 
the field of crisis communication and warrant further study. 
Another area of research to consider is how to ensure homeland security leaders 
are trained to communicate critical crisis communication messages at the local, state, or 
federal levels for all phases of a disaster. Expanding upon this concept, it would be 
helpful to study what changes are needed (i.e., policy, processes, etc.) to ensure that U.S. 
leaders at various levels of government effectively use a comprehensive crisis 
communication strategy. 
In considering whether the public can be influenced to take a specific action 
during a disaster or crisis, there would be benefit to looking at research on how terrorists 
use communication techniques to influence the public and get them involved in a cause. 
One book in particular, Inside Terrorism, by Bruce Hoffman (2006), addresses this 
specifically. Hoffman discusses how terrorists began to communicate about suicide 
terrorism as a normal activity for young people, and then successfully shifted the societal 
view of it to acceptable, even heroic, to gain more recruits (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 145–
154). Further review of materials on terrorism communication techniques may help 
provide insight on how to better use messages and emotional arguments to engage the 
public in a disaster/crisis preparedness and response situation, shifting society’s view of 
their role in these efforts from simply recommended to a critical individual responsibility.    
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